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Compulsory Judicial Arbitration in California:
Reducing the Delay and Expense
of Resolving Uncomplicated Civil Disputes
Our administration of justice is not decadent. It is simply behind
the times .... [W]e may look forward to a near future when
our courts will be swift and certain agents of justice, whose de-
cisions will be acquiesced in and respected by all.'
Roscoe Pound, 1906
[Wie did not heed [Roscoe Pound's] warning, and today, in the
final third of this century, we are still trying to operate the courts
with fundamentally the same basic methods, the same procedures,
and the same machinery he said were not good enough in 1906.
2
Chief Justice Warren Burger, 1970
The U.S. has created the most sophisticated - and the fairest -
legal process in the world. But the burdens are becoming in-
tolerable3
Footlick, Too Much Law?
Newsweek Cover Story, January 10, 1977
Introduction: The Severity of Judicial Inefficiency
Disputes among people are inevitable. For this reason civil
courts have evolved to adjudicate these private disagreements accord-
ing to law. As society has become more urbanized and complex, the
substantive law has changed to reflect new values. Nonetheless, the
primary objective of the civil legal system has remained constant:
the provision of effective justice.
For justice to be effective, not only must the law be fair, but also
the machinery developed to administer the law must dispense justice
inexpensively and quickly without sacrificing fairness.4 In uncompli-
1. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 395, 416-17 (1906).
2. Remarks of Chief Justice Warren Burger before the American Bar Association
(August 10, 1970), reprinted in H. JAMms, Ciusis rN TE COURTS iii (rev. ed. 1971).
3. NEwswE , January 10, 1977, at 47.
4. Justice is effective when fairly administered without delay by competent judges
operating in a modem court system under simple and efficient rules of procedure.
A mmcAN BAn ASSOCIATION, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
2-3 (5th ed. 1971).
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cated civil cases,5 inefficient judicial machinery often results in a denial
of effective justice. This denial occurs when litigants must pay dis-
proportionately high costs and withstand inordinate delays to litigate
valid claims. Effective justice is also denied if litigants compromise
valid claims when confronted with the use of the expensive and con-
gested civil justice system as a bargaining tool in the settlement proc-
ess. 7  Critics of the administration of justice have concluded that such
denial of effective justice has led to a general popular dissatisfaction
with the administration of the civil justice system.5
In July 1976, the California legislature, recognizing the inefficiency
of current judicial administration," enacted a voluntary judicial arbi-
tration procedure1 ° based on the key elements of judicial arbitration
that have been developed in jurisdictions outside California. Under
this procedure, a pending civil case is arbitrated by volunteer attorney-
arbitrators if the plaintiff elects or both parties stipulate; if either party
is dissatisfied with the arbitration award there is an automatic right
to trial de novo. 11 The success of this statute depends principally on
two factors: first, the bar must act aggressively to initiate election and
stipulation so that arbitration can significantly reduce congestion and
delay; and second, a sufficient number of volunteer attorney-arbi-
trators upon whom the procedure exclusively relies must be available.
In short, if judicial arbitration is to aid in alleviating the high cost
and protracted delay of the congested civil justice system, it will be
as an accomplishment of the practicing bar.
5. For purposes of this Note an "uncomplicated civil case" is defined as one in-
volving no complex legal or factual issues. Such cases are typically personal injury
or property damage cases not involving death or severe injury. These cases, if con-
tested, generally involve juries and therefore place the greatest demand on judicial
resources. See notes 20-22 & accompanying text infra.
6. See generally INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS OF
TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION (1974).
7. In 1975-76, only about 7% of personal injury cases on the civil active list
were resolved by trial. CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 209 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1977 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT].
8. See, e.g., Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1976).
9. "There is presently an excessive burden of litigation in the courts in Cali-
fornia; . . . [t]he entire judicial process in California is overloaded causing extensive
delay to citizens who are entitled to speedy justice; . .. [this overloading of the courts
also seriously increases the costs of civil litigation; and . . . court procedures must
be studied and streamlined .... .. S. Res. 139, 1971 Reg. Sess., JOURNAL OF THE
SENATE 2766.
10. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.10 (West Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Cali-
fornia Judicial Arbitration Statute].
11. Pursuant to the statute the Judicial Council promulgated rules effective July
1, 1976. See CAL. R. CT. 1601-17 (West Supp. 1977).
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The purpose of this Note is to stimulate an early positive response
to the new Judicial Arbitration Statute in California by examining the
nature and effectiveness of judicial arbitration. The first section will
describe the nature and scope of inefficiencies in the civil judicial
machinery in California. The next section will propose standards for
measuring the effectiveness of judicial arbitration in reducing judicial
inefficiency. The most recent experiences of several jurisdictions with
judicial arbitration, both voluntary and compulsory, will then be re-
viewed and measured against the standards established. It will be
contended that compulsory judicial arbitration is superior to the vol-
untary form. Finally, it will be argued that the legislature should
replace the voluntary Judicial Arbitration Statute with a compulsory
form and that, in the absence of legislation, local courts in California
possess the authority to adopt a compulsory procedure as a supple-
ment to statutory voluntary judicial arbitration.
Need for Alternatives to Traditional Civil Litigation
Delay and Backlog in California Superior Courts
The problem of delay and backlog can be viewed as one of supply
and demand. Delay and backlog result when the demand on the
courts consistently exceeds the supply of available judicial resources.
Delay has been called the most important "root problem" in poorly
administered justice.' 2  It is both lawyer' 3 and court caused. Prior
to the time a lawyer requests a trial date with an at-issue memo-
randum, delay is lawyer caused. 14  For this reason the Judicial Council
of California measures court caused delay from the date of at-issue
memorandum to trial.' 5 Backlog represents the number of cases at-
issue awaiting a trial date.
Delay in most California superior courts is severe.'0 In 1975-76
only three superior courts were within the six month interval from
12. Kaufman, The Judicial Crisis: Court Delay and the Para-Judge, 54 JuDicA-
TurE 145, 147 (Nov. 1970).
13. See A. LEviN & A. WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AN DEi.AY (1964); Rosenberg, Court
Congestion: Status, Causes and Proposed Remedies, in REPoRT oF =su 27H AmRucAN
ASSEMBLY, TnE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION, 37 (1965).
14. Statutes of limitation apply to the complaint filing date. See, e.g., CAL. Cry.
PRoc. CODE §§ 312, 350 (West 1956). Once filed, there is little statutory incentive for
lawyers to seek a trial date by filing an at-issue memorandum.
15. 1977 JUDICLAL CouNcIL REPORT, supra note 7, at 12.
16. "[R]apid or sustained increases in inventories of cases awaiting trial are cause
for concern. The 17.5% increase in 1975-76 over the previous year is troubling."
Id. at 209. Court conditions are deteriorating because this 17.5% increase followed
a 10% increase in 1974-75. Id. at 208.
Because only 2% of municipal court filings involve non-small claims court civil
matters, superior court delay affects nearly all civil cases, small and large. Id. at 220.
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at-issue to trial considered desirable by the California Rules of
Court.1 7  By contrast, in the San Francisco and Los Angeles superior
courts, the interval was twenty months in 1975-76.1s This already
prolonged delay is expected to become worse because the state-wide
backlog in the number of civil cases increased by 17.5 percent in 1975-
76.1" This severe delay is caused by jury trials: although the number
of such cases is relatively small, 20 they are the most time consuming
the expensive method of disposition.21  Criminal and personal injury
cases require 88 percent of juries empaneled.22  Even though juries
are empaneled in only 4.9 percent of all personal injury cases, these
cases place the most substantial demand on available civil judicial
manpower.
2 3
Backlog and delay have a dynamic effect on congestion by further
postponing disposition of those cases normally settled on the eve of
trial. As a result these cases, many of which neither party intends
to litigate, remain on the civil trial list, thereby artificially delaying
major cases more likely to be tried.2 4  Faster disposition of cases
destined to settle therefore will produce speedier resolution of more
complicated trial bound cases.
Increasing the municipal court jurisdictional amount without a concomitant improve-
ment in procedure is not a solution to superior court congestion. This alternative
would simply shift the problem to municipal courts.
17. In Santa Clara, Stanislaus, and Santa Barbara counties, superior courts met
the standard. Id. at 212-13.
18. The delay in San Diego and Alameda county superior courts in 1975-76 was
also approximately 20 months. Id.
19. Id. at 210. The number of backlogged cases, 91,978, was higher than any
previous year and triple the number of backlogged cases in 1966-67, 28,088. Id. at
208.
20. For example, out of 57,248 personal injury, death, and property damage
cases disposed of in California superior courts in 1974-75, only 4,641 (8%) even started
trial. Because some cases are settled during trial, over 92% of these types of cases
are settled without complete trial. CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT
156-57 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT].
21. Id. at 108.
22. Id.
23. Seventy-three percent of all civil actions involving juries are personal injury
cases. Id. A jury was sworn in 93% of all contested personal injury cases in 1974-75.
See id. at 107-08.
24. One author asserts that this tendency to settle on the courthouse steps is the
equivalent of "congestion by lawyer consent." Milwid, Arbitration as a Supplement
to Judicial Proceedings in Personal Injury Cases, U. ILL. L.F. 208, 209 (1962). See
also Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59
COLUM. L. REv. 1115, 1125 n.41 (1959) (quoting A. LEvIN & A. WOOLLEY, DISPATChi
AND DELAY (1964)), "In Allegheny County [Pittsburgh], Pennsylvania, 'there is evi-
dence that a significantly large number of cases . . . are settled only after a jury is
sworn, in order to allow the attorney to collect his fee for a day in court.' " Id.
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Excessive Costs
Litigants in relatively low value cases may often be pressured into
unwise settlements because of the cost burdens of the traditional pro-
cedure. Lawyers may experience profit pressures. Low value cases
undertaken on a contingency basis require much the same pre-trial
preparation, number of court appearances, and trial time as higher
value cases, thereby resulting in a much lower attorney profit. At-
torneys for plaintiffs may therefore be inclined to press for settlement
as quickly as possible. Similarly, defendants may be forced to settle
or run the risk of incurring disproportionately high costs in defense.2 5
Under these circumstances, by insisting on the entire panoply of pre-
trial and trial procedural devices, including a judge or jury26 trial, the
litigant may be protected in theory but economically doomed in prac-
tice. Invocation of these procedures may be especially unjustifiable
because they may be unwarranted in an uncomplicated low value case.
Effective Justice Denied
For most litigants the formal machinery of justice has become
little more than a lever used to gain a settlement advantage. Because
dispute resolution is an unpleasant experience for most people, their
natural reaction is a desire to end it as quickly as possible. The bar-
gaining weapon represented by the cost and congestion of the judicial
system is therefore a needlessly unfair influence. Plaintiffs with severe
injuries, burdensome medical expenses, and wage losses who are faced
with the unfair threat of protracted delay and high cost of trial prep-
aration, frequently settle for less than their out-of-pocket expenses.
Lesser actions, some of which are only nuisance claims, on the other
hand, are settled promptly at a relatively higher proportion of alleged
or real out-of-pocket expenses. 27
25. The California Legislature, in adopting as a pilot project radically simplified
rules of civil procedure for nonjury cases involving less than $25,000, stated: "The
legislature finds and declares that the costs of civil litigation have risen sharply in
recent years. This increase in litigation costs makes it more difficult to enforce smaller
claims even though the claim is valid or makes it economically disadvantageous to
defend against an invalid claim." CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDE § 1823 (West Supp. 1977).
26. A jury trial can lead to higher costs in at least three ways: 1) greater evi-
dentiary and procedural safeguards, as well as jury selection and deliberation, add to
the length of the trial; 2) abuse and overuse of discovery can result from the apparent
belief that juries are unpredictable and can produce runaway verdicts; and 3) the
duplicate use of expert witnesses may occur because neither party wants to rely on
the jury's reaction to the other's expert witness.
27. See H. Ross, SarrrEan OuT OF CoxRT 204-10 (1970). In this empirical study
of the settlement process, the author indicates that in smaller cases insurance claims
adjusters use the uncertainty of high cost and delay of the judicial process as a tool
to secure a discount from the full value of a claim. The study suggests that the higher
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Even if this unfair pressure to settle is successfully resisted, delay
and backlog may continue to have an adverse effect on the quality
of justice administered. If three to five years have passed since the
time of the incident, parties and witnesses suffer fading memories and
may even become unavailable for trial.8
Standards for Measuring Effectiveness of Judicial Arbitration
The following standards are suggested as a method of evaluating
the relative effectiveness of existing judicial arbitration procedures in
reducing procedural inefficiency:
1. Speed - The 92,000 case backlog existing in 1975-7629 must be
eliminated and all new at-issue filings should be resolved within
the six month period prescribed by the California Rules of Court.
30
2. Economy - The cost to resolve uncomplicated civil cases must be
reduced to maintain the economic feasibility of enforcing and de-
fending valid claims.
3. Fairness - Determinations of fact and law must be accurate to
safeguard fairness in reaching decisions.
The objectives of speed and economy are self-explanatory and
lend themselves to accurate measurement. Fairness, however, is an
element which resists quantification; nevertheless, simply streamlining
the administration of justice without ensuring continued fairness would
be a step back from the delivery of effective justice. Appeal rates,
which can be computed, may be one index of fairness. Dissatisfied
litigants may choose not to take appeals for a variety of reasons. 3'
Nonetheless, a procedural innovation that produces appeal rates com-
parable to those of the present civil justice system, other factors being
equal, would appear to generate no greater dissatisfaction with the
fairness of dispute resolution than current procedures. The appeal
rate to courts of appeal from California superior courts for civil dis-
positions has ranged from eleven to fourteen percent since 1967-68. 32
Consequently, substantial fairness would probably be suggested if
appeals to trial de novo from judicial arbitration were equal to the
the value of the case the lower the ratio of settlement payments to actual out-of-pocket
expenses.
28. As a means of minimizing the problems of lengthy delays, pretrial discovery
becomes more extensive and enhances still further the expense of trying uncomplicated
cases.
29. See note 19 supra.
30. See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
31. For example, the litigant may believe that the additional expense of taking
an appeal is unjustified under the circumstances or may simply desire to forget the
entire incident.
32. 1977 JUDICIAL CouNciL REPORT, note 7 supra, at 185 (table VII).
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eleven to fourteen percent rate of appeal from traditional judicial
litigation.
A comparison of jury verdicts arrived at within the traditional
civil justice system with results obtained under an alternative proce-
dure may provide another quantifiable measurement of fairness. An
innovative procedure that produces verdicts and damage awards com-
parable to jury results in comparable cases is likely to be viewed by
litigants as fair.
Following a general description of judicial arbitration, several
jurisdictions will be independently evaluated to determine the success
of each procedure in satisfying the objectives of speed, economy, and
fairness.
Judicial Arbitration Plans
In general, judicial arbitration involves the transfer of pending
civil cases from the court to a volunteer attorney or panel of attorneys
who determine the facts and the law according to relaxed rules of
evidence and procedure. 33  The decision of the attorney-arbitrator or
panel is entered as a judgment if neither party requests a trial de novo
within a specified period after the award, usually twenty days.
Contrast to Traditional Arbitration
Arbitration as a form of dispute resolution existed before the
beginning of English Common Law,34 whereas judicial arbitration
33. See generally Kalven, Alternatives to Present Auto Accident Tort System, 1
CONN. L. REv. 33 (1968); La Brum, Congested Trial Calendars: It's About Time to
Do Something About Them, 43 A.B.A.J. 311 (1957); Leibold, Has Binding Arbitration
Become Unbound?, 31 SiNrLE 123 (1968); Milwid, Arbitration as a Supplement to
Judicial Proceedings in Personal Injury Cases, U. ILL. L.F. 208 (1962); Parness, The
Expanding Role of the Parajudge in the United States, in AMERICAN JuDmCATuRE So-
ciETy REsEARCH REPORT (Preliminary Draft) 30-33 (July, 1973); Rosenberg & Schubin,
Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARv.
L. REv. 448 (1961); Sarpy, Arbitration As a Means of Reducing Court Congestion,
41 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 182 (1965); Wexler, Court-Ordered Consumer Arbitration, 28
ARB. J. 175 (1973); Comment, Arbitration - A Viable Alternative?, 3 FoiwHAM Urm.
L. J. 53 (1974); Note, Compulsory Arbitration to Relieve Trial Calendar Congestion,
8 STAN. L. REv. 410 (1956); Comment, Nontraditional Remedies to Consumer Disputes,
49 TEmP. L. Q. 385 (1976).
34. California Law Revision Commission, Recommendation and Study Relating
to Arbitration 27 (1960). But the "[elarly common law developed a distaste for the
concept and . . . rendered agreements to arbitrate virtually unenforceable." RESTATE-
MEr OF CoNrcrAcs §§ 550, 551(1) (1932). See also 6 WLLISTON ON CoNTRAcrs
§§ 1919, 5360-62 (rev. ed. 1938). The arbitration award was final and enforceable
only if completed. Id. at § 1927. In contrast, "California, many other states and the
federal government have provided that agreements to arbitrate existing or future dis-
putes are specifically enforceable." Halperin, Arbitration of Superior Court Cases: A
January 1978]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
is an innovation of relatively recent vintage. Under traditional arbi-
tration, the arbitrator has jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to
a contractual agreement between the parties.3 5  There are three basic
elements: the process is voluntary, the award is final, and the arbi-
trator is chosen by the parties. 36  By contrast, the term "judicial arbi-
tration" is a misnomer because most of the new judicial arbitration
procedures adopted outside of California 3- have abandoned all three
traditional elements. First, the courts have jurisdiction over judicial
arbitration by virtue of the pendency of a civil suit. Judicial arbitra-
tion is compulsory on parties to pending litigation if the dispute falls
within a specified category.38  Second, the results of arbitration may
not be final because a litigant may request a trial de novo within a
limited period following the arbitrator's decision. 39  Finally, the parties
Preliminary Guide, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 472, 473 (1976) (citing CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§§ 1280-1294.2 (West 1972); 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970)) [hereinafter cited as Halperin].
35. Traditional arbitration laws were recodified by the legislature in 1961 in CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 1972), which prescribed a detailed scheme
for resolving disputes subject to traditional written arbitration agreements. Pursuant
to these statutes, the courts are given authority to supervise the arbital process only
when their aid is invoked by one of the parties to the arbitration agreement. The
aid of the court can be invoked in several areas: 1) enforcing the right to arbitration
(CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1972)); 2) staying or restraining court pro-
ceedings when the subject matter of such proceedings falls within the scope of an
arbitration clause or staying arbitration proceedings until the resolution of court pro-
ceedings (CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.2, 1928.4 (West 1972)); 3) correcting or
modifying arbitration awards (CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 1286.6, 1286.8 (West 1972));
4) confirming awards (CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1285 (West 1972)); and 5) vacating
awards (CAL. Civ. PROC. ConE §§ 1286.2, 1286.4 (West 1972)). Also, there are
statutory guidelines for the conduct of arbitration hearings (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
1282-1284.2 (West 1972)) and for the appointment of arbitrators when the parties
fail to provide for one in the agreement (CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1281.6 (West 1972) ).
36. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COiIssIoN, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RE-
LATING TO ARBITRATION 27 (1960).
37. These include those adopted by Pennsylvania in 1952, 1836 Pa. Laws, P.L.
715 § 13 (codified at 5 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 30 (Purdon Supp. 1977)); Ohio in 1970
(by Cuyahoga County local rule of court), OHIO REV. CODE ANN., CUtAHOCA CT.
C.P.R. 29 (Page 1974)); New York in 1970, 1970 N.Y. Laws c. 1004 (codified at N.Y.
Jun. LAW § 213(8) (McKinney Supp. 1977)); Nevada in 1971, 1971 Nev. Stats. c. 553
§§ 1-5 (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 38.215-45 (1975)); and Alaska in 1972, 1972
Alaska Sess. Laws c. 94 § 2 (codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.190-09.43.220 (1973)).
38. Cf. Unimart v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 82 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1969)
(consent of parties required for traditional arbitration). Statutes cover some phases of
the traditional arbitration process, but the matters decided by the arbitrator are de-
termined by the parties in the agreement conferring jurisdiction on the arbitrator. See,
e.g., CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 1972). See also Swift-Chaplin
Products, Inc. v. Love, 219 Cal. App. 2d 110, 32 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1963); Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Dennis, 229 Cal. App. 2d 541, 40 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1964).
39. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1972): "A written agreement to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid,
[Vol. 29
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usually have no direct power to select the volunteer attorney who
serves as arbitrator.
40
Judicial Arbitration Outside of California
Pennsylvania/Philadelphia Plan
The compulsory arbitration program in Pennsylvania has been
described as "the oldest, most refined, most utilized and most copied
of any arbitration program . . . in the United States." 41  Drawing
upon and amending an 1836 arbitration statute, the Pennsylvania
legislature authorized the courts of common pleas (trial courts) to
enact by rule of court a compulsory arbitration program for all cases
with an amount in controversy below an established level.42
Although almost all Pennsylvania counties have enacted compul-
sory arbitration rules pursuant to this statute, the best available infor-
mation exists for Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania's largest.43  Under
the Philadelphia local rules, with certain exceptions, 4 4 arbitration is
compulsory in all cases with an amount in controversy below a specified
figure, currently $10,000. 45 Flexibility is introduced through a pro-
vision that cases may be removed by the calendar judge and placed
on the jury calendar by petition of a party.
46
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any
contract." For the limited grounds for vacating a traditional arbitration award see
CAL. Civ. Pnoc. CODE §§ 1286.2, 1286.4 (West 1972). These provisions are narrowly
construed in favor of the validity of the award. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo Bay Prop-
erties, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Cal. App. 3d 556, 567-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. 733,
741-43 (1972) ("[blias of arbitrator not to be inferred"); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Guleserian, 28 Cal. App. 3d 397, 104 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1972) (award upheld
despite arbitrator's error of law).
40. Cf. CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 1281.6 (West 1972).
41. California Judicial Council, A Study of the Role of Arbitration in the Judicial
Process 27 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Council Arbitration Study].
42. [T]he several courts of common pleas may by rule of court, provide that all
cases which are at issue where the amount in controversy shall be . . . $1,000 or less,
except those involving title to real estate, shall first be submitted to and heard by a
board of three . . . members of the bar of the county for consideration and award.
1951 Pa, Laws, P.L. 2087 § 1 (current version codified at 5 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 30
(Purdon Supp. 1977)).
43. Compiled Materials on the Philadelphia Compulsory Arbitration Program 1
(April 1, 1973) (available from the Court of Common Pleas Office of Public Informa-
tion, Philadelphia, Pa.) [hereinafter cited as compiled materials on Philadelphia Com-
pulsory Arbitration Plan].
44. Excepted are cases involving title to real estate and actions in equity. PHM-
ADELPHIA CT. C.P. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION R. I (1971).
45. The Court of Common Pleas increased the award limit to $2,000 in 1958,
$3,000 in 1968, and $10,000 in 1971. Id. at 2-3. Compiled Materials on the Phila-
delphia Compulsory Arbitration Program 2-3 (April 1, 1973).
46. Compiled Materials on the Philadelphia Compulsory Arbitration Plan, supra
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A case is set for hearing approximately forty days after a certi-
ficate of readiness is filed.47  It is heard by a board of three arbitra-
tors48 appointed at random from a list of almost 6,000 volunteer
Philadelphia attorneys.49  Established rules of evidence apply; how-
ever, they are generally to "be liberally construed to promote justice."u
In practice this has effected a considerable simplification in the presen-
tation of evidence.51 The arbitrators may exercise the general powers
of the court in conducting the hearing, 52 but the judge for arbitration
retains full supervisory powers over questions related to the rules of
evidence and the conduct of the proceedings in general.
5 3
note 43, at 6. "A favorable decision on such a petition is dependent upon two con-
siderations. The first is that the special damages, medical expenses and wage losses,
as outlined in the complaint, are in excess of $2,500 or that the case involves a serious
injury such as wrongful death, permanent or serious disfigurement, dismemberment.
The second consideration is that the Calendar Judge is convinced by the attorneys in
the case that an appeal will result regardless of the arbitrator's award. The latter is
a rare occurrence. When the Calendar Judge is convinced of the conviction of the
attorneys, however, he does not hesitate to exercise his discretion in removing the case
from arbitration, even though the amount in controversy might fall under the $10,000
compulsory arbitration limit." Id.
47. Id. at 7. "This built-in delay allows the opposing attorney ample opportunity
to file motions to have the case placed on the major case calendar, and also opportunity
for negotiations and preparation to be completed." Id.
48. PHILADELPHIA CT. C.P. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION R. II(C) (1971), provides
"The Board of Arbitrators shall consist of three members, unless the parties in the case
shall agree upon a lesser number."
49. Remarks of Mayer Horwitz, Philadelphia Arbitration Committee Chairman,
at San Francisco Bay Regional Conference on Court Modernization, Hastings College
of The Law (June 5, 1975) (transcript on file with Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter
cited as Horwitz speech].
Over a 10 year period between 1958-1968 each volunteer attorney participated in
51 arbitration hearings for an average of 5 hearings per year. Because the hearings
were normally consolidated this amounted to less than 5 days of volunteer time per
year. The fees earned by volunteering are small and the average attorney received
$122 per year during this period. Compiled Materials on the Philadelphia Com-
pulsory Arbitration Program, note 43 supra, at 53.
50. PHILADELPHIA CT. C.P. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION R. III(E) (1971).
51. Testimony may be offered by deposition. In actions involving personal injury
or damage to property, medical bills and reports may be offered into evidence by giving
the adverse party one week's written notice, accompanied by a copy of the document
to be placed into evidence. All medical evidence must be in written form. Id. Med-
ical testimony is admissible only upon receiving the permission of the court; in any
event, the number of such requests has been minimal. See Compiled Materials on
the Philadelphia Compulsory Arbitration Plan, note 43 supra, at 8. Police, weather,
and salary loss reports are admissible without formal proof of authenticity. Id.;
PHILADELPHIA CT. C.P. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION R. II1(E) 4(e) (1971).
52. PHILADELPHIA CT. C.P. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION R. III(E) (1971).
53. Compiled Materials on the Philadelphia Compulsory Arbitration Plan, note
43 supra, at 8-9. See PHILADELPHIA CT. C.P. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION R. III(F)
(1971).
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The board of arbitrators arrives at its decision by majority vote and
files a report within fifteen days; 54 the decision has the effect of a final
judgment absent an appeal by one of the parties,55 which is to trial
de novo. 56 The appellant must pay all costs incurred to the date of
appeal,5 7 and reimburse the county a sum to cover the arbitrator's
fees. 8  The arbitration proceedings are inadmissible as evidence at
the trial."9
Performance - After twenty years judicial arbitration has become
the predominant procedure for disposition of civil cases in the court
of common pleas, 71 percent of all civil dispositions being arbitrated in
1975.60 Compulsory arbitration has eliminated the backlog of cases
involving claims within the jurisdictional amount. By freeing the
courts to resolve major cases, compulsory arbitration has helped reduce
major case delay from 84 months in 1971 to 48 months in 1975.61
This improvement in efficiency has not only benefited the courts,
but appears to have met the objective standards for evaluating the
delivery of effective justice. 62  In 1975, roughly three out of four
litigants in civil actions resolved their disputes within ninety days from
filing a certificate of readiness.63  Additionally, the simplification of
evidentiary procedures was a major factor in substantially reducing
the cost of dispute resolution to both the litigants and the courts.6
4
54. Compiled Materials on the Philadelphia Compulsory Arbitration Plan, note
43 supra, at 9.
55. PIIILADELPHIA CT. C.P. COMPULSORY ARBrrATION R. IV (1971).
56. Id. at R. VI.
57. Compiled Materials on the Philadelphia Compulsory Arbitration Plan, note
43 supra, at 9.
58. This sum may not exceed one-half of the amount in controversy. PHMA-
DELPHIA CT. C.P. COMPULSORY ARBrrrATioN R. VI. The appeal costs are approximate-
ly $165, consisting of arbitrator's fees ($110), appeal bond ($20), and reinbursement
of appellee's record costs ($35). Letter from Mayer Horwitz, Philadelphia Arbitra-
tion Committee Chairman to R. J. Heher (Jan. 31, 1977) (on file with Hastings Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Horwitz letter].
59. Philadelphia Ct. C.P. Compulsory Arbitration R. VI(B) (1971).
60. PHILADELPHrA CoUrT OF COMMON PLEAS & MuNrcnA.L COURTS, ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1 (1975).
61. Compare Horwitz speech, note 49 supra, at 4, with Horwitz letter, note 58
supra. The 84 month delay existed at the time the legislature increased the jurisdic-
tional amount for compulsory arbitration from $3,000 to $10,000. See note 45 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
63. Horwitz speech, note 49 supra, at 4.
64. See Horwitz speech, note 49 supra. See also, Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 112
A.2d 625 (1955), appeal dismissed, sub nom. Smith v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955):
"[Tihere will be a saving to claimants of both time and expense by reason of greater
flexibility in fixing the exact day and hour for hearings before the arbitrators as com-
pared with the more cumbersome and less adaptable arrangements of court calendars."
A Philadelphia arbitration commissioner estimated that the public cost of arbitrating
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Therefore, the criteria of both speed and economy have been satisfied.
Litigant satisfaction with the fairness of compulsory arbitration
has been indicated by both appeal rates and comparison with jury
verdicts. Appeals to trial de novo have averaged between eight and
twelve percent, " with less than five percent actually going to trial
rather than settling.66 A comparison of arbitration awards with judge
or jury verdicts in those cases appealed to trial is further evidence of
substantial fairness. A study conducted over a sixteen month period
in 1971-72 concluded that "the distribution pattern of awards by
arbitrators correlates quite closely, both on questions of liability and
assessment of damage, with verdicts rendered by judges and juries
for similar cases on appeal."67  Of the 296 cases appealed to a verdict,
71 percent resulted in verdicts for the plaintiff and 29 percent for the
defendant.6s The comparable figures for all arbitration awards during
the same time period were 80 percent and 20 percent.6 9
Achievement of effective justice is also demonstrated by the com-
parability of jury and arbitration-awarded damages during the sixteen
month period after the jurisdictional amount for arbitration was in-
creased to $10,000.70 The majority of both arbitrator awards and
jury verdicts was below $3,000; 80 percent of arbitrator awards and
88 percent of jury verdicts were below $5,000. 1 The study concluded
that "[t]his correlation and the low rate of appeal indicate a high level
of quality decisions under the Philadelphia Arbitration Program."7 2
Most commentators who have analyzed the Philadelphia program
over the years have concluded that compulsory arbitration should be
adopted in other jurisdictions.7 3
a case is about ten times less than the cost of trying the same case in court. JOURNAL
OF AMERICAN INSURANCE, Sept.-Oct. 1969, at 1.
65. Letter from Charles S. Shapiro, Deputy Court Administrator for Public In-
formation, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas to Mayer Horwitz (Feb. 2, 1977)
(on file with Hastings Law Journal).
66. Most cases requesting trial de novo settle before trial. Horwitz letter, note
58 supra.
67. JUDICIAL COUNCIL ARBITRATION STUDY, note 41 supra, at 33.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See note 45 supra.
71. JUDICIAL COUNCIL ARBITRATION STUDY, note 41 supra, at 31, 33.
72. Id. at 33.
73. See, e.g., LaBrum, Congested Trial Calendars: It's About Time to Do Some-
thing About Them, 43 A.B.A.J. 311 (1957); Leibold, Has Binding Arbitration Become
Unbound? 31 SHINGLE 123 (1968); Milwid, Arbitration as a Supplement to Judicial
Proceedings in Personal Injury Cases, U. ILL,. L.F. 208 (1962); Sarpy, Arbitration as a
Means of Reducing Court Congestion, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 182 (1965); Walker,
Compulsory Arbitration Revisited, 38 PA. B.A.Q. 36 (1966); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL AD-
MINISTRATION, Compulsory Arbitration and Court Congestion - The Pennsylvania
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New York Pilot Program
New York adopted compulsory arbitration as a pilot project 74 in
the city court of Monroe County (Rochester) in September 1970.
7
5
The compulsory arbitration rules are in essence similar to the Phila-
delphia procedures, with minor variations .
7
Performance - Compulsory arbitration has eliminated civil case
congestion. At the outset of the program there were 1,500 civil cases
backlogged, and there was a two year wait from at-issue filing to trial.77
As of January 1977, there was no backlog of civil cases, and the elapsed
time from at-issue filing to trial was between forty-five and sixty days.78
Further, by transferring cases to the city court the supreme court has
also reduced its backlog substantially. The Rochester area Seventh
judicial District State Supreme Court had a backlog of 5,275 cases in
November 1970 but, as of March 1975, had only 715 cases pending.79
Compulsory Arbitration Statute I (Supp. 1959); Jtn 5 L.L CoUNCIL ARBITRATION STUDY,
note 41 supra. A study of this plan giving it mixed reviews, predicted that differ-
ences in arbitration awards versus jury verdicts would preclude increasing the juris-
diction amount above the $2,000 level which was in effect when the study was con-
ducted. The study, a Columbia Project investigation of the Philadelphia experience
covering its first 22 months of operation, concluded that "it may work in lesser
courts, [but it] does not warrant adoption as an antidote for delay in major courts."
Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in REPORT OF
THE 27Tm AMEIucAN ASSEMBLY, THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND T= LAW ExPLOsION
29, 51 (1965). The greatest beneficial impact, however, occurred after the increase
in jurisdictional amount to $10,000. See note 61 supra.
74. The Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference was authorized to "pro-
mulgate rules for the compulsory arbitration of claims for the recovery of a sum of
money not exceeding $3,000 exclusive of interest, pending in any court or courts."
1970 N.Y. LAws c. 1004 (currently, N.Y. JuD. LAW ANN. § 213(8) (McKinney Supp.
1977). In September, 1971 the jurisdictional amount was increased to $4,000. 1971
N.Y. LAws c. 1056.
75. Memorandum of Arbitration Commissioner, State of New York, App. Div.,
4th Dept., (Feb. 1977) (on file with Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as
memorandum of N.Y. Arbitration Commissioner]. This represents the maximum juris-
dictional amount for any civil case in city court. The pilot program has since been
extended to the Bronx, Binghamton, and Schenectady, NEw YoRc JuDiLmL CONFER-
ENCE, ANNUAL REPORT 18 (1974).
76. Compare PImADE.LPHmA CT. C.P. COMPULSORY AU3rrRAT[ON R. (1971) with
22 N.Y.C. R.R. 28.1-,15. Except for cases commenced in small claims court, all cases
for money damages involving $4,000 or less must be decided by a panel of three ar-
bitrators. A single arbitrator is used in cases involving $500 or less (22 N.Y.C. R.R.
28.2). In addition, cases transferred to the city court from the supreme court, the
highest state c~urt of original jurisdiction must also be arbitrated. 22 N.Y.C. R.R.
28.2.
77. UPDATE, January, 1977, at 4 (a bi-monthly publication of the Monroe County
Bar Association).
78. Id.
79. Rochester Democrat & Chronicle, Apr. 26, 1975.
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In addition to increased speed, there is also evidence that arbitration
reduces expense to litigants. The arbitration commissioner estimates
that the average time for a trial in arbitration is one hour and a half as
compared to a minimum of two days to try the same case in court,80
and there are no calendar calls or court appearances to be made.8'
Litigants appear to be satisfied with the fairness of arbitration pro-
ceedings. Only 11 percent of the arbitrated cases result in appeal to
a trial de novo, and of these, only one percent actually went to trial.12
Attorney interest is evidenced by the fact that over 95 percent of the
active practicing bar in Rochester is currently acting as arbitrators. 83
Expansion of the program to include small claims court, child support
and alimony cases is contemplated. 84
Cuyahoga County, Ohio Local Rule
Unlike Pennsylvania and New York, the Cuyahoga County Com-
mon Pleas Court in Cleveland adopted compulsory arbitration by local
rule of court, not pursuant to a statewide statute. 5 The Cleveland
local rule is patterned after the Philadelphia plan.86 All civil cases
are placed upon the arbitration list when the judge at pre-trial con-
ference determines the amount in controversy to be $5,000 or less.8 7
When the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000, the case may be
placed on the arbitration list if both parties stipulate to arbitration. 8
The most significant departure from the Philadelphia plan is that
the normal rules of evidence do not apply. 9 Arbitrators are to be
guided in accepting evidence only by considerations of materiality
80. Memorandum of New York Arbitration Commissioner, note 75 supra.
81. Id.
82. Id. The only disincentive to appeal is that a request for trial de novo must
be accompanied by a reimbursement of the arbitrators' fees ($45 for a single arbitrator
and $115 for a panel). Memorandum of New York Arbitration Commissioner, note
75 supra.
83. Id. A resolution of the board of trustees of the Monroe County Bar Associa-
tion issued on January 11, 1977 (on file with Hastings Law Journal) states that "the
Program of Compulsory Arbitration in the County of Monroe, since inception, has and
continues to produce enormous beneficial consequences . . . and continues to be en-
thusiastically supported by the members of the Bar .... " This resolution also recom-
mended extension of compulsory arbitration to other New York state courts and recom-
mended that the monetary and compulsory arbitration jurisdiction of the City Court
of Rochester be increased to $6,000. Id.
84. Memorandum of New York Arbitration Commissioner, note 75 supra.
85. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN., CUYAHOGA COUNTY CT. C.P.R. 29 (Page 1974).
86. Letter from R. A. Williams, Arbitration Commissioner, Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas, to R. J. Heher (Feb. 3, 1977) (on file with Hastings Law
Journal).
87. Onio REv. CODE ANN., CUYAHOGA COUNTY CT. C.P.R. 29 (I) (Page 1974).
88. Id.
89. See id. at (III) (F).
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and relevancy.0O Arbitrators are to give all evidence "such weight as
they deem it is entitled to after consideration of any objections made
to its admission."91 As with the Philadelphia plan the arbitrators have
the general powers of the court. 92  Awards must be filed within 30
days,93 and litigants have 30 days after filing to appeal to a trial de
novo.
9 4
Peiformance - The effectiveness of the Cuyahoga County plan
is more difficult to ascertain than either the Philadelphia or Rochester
programs. The time limits imposed on arbitration proceedings, as
well as relaxed rules of evidence, would seem to indicate improvements
in speed and economy similar to those achieved elsewhere. The num-
ber of decisions for the plaintiff were comparable to the Philadelphia
experience. 95  A possible problem with litigant satisfaction may exist
because Cleveland's overall appeal rate to trial de novo is 26 percent, 96
which is significantly higher than either Philadelphia's9  or Roches-
ter's.98 Since 1970, however, only three percent of appealed awards
have actually completed trial,9 9 a figure comparable to the Philadelphia
experience. 100 Thus it is possible that the high appeal rate may reflect
90. Id. Medical and property damage bills may be received in evidence without
further proof if one week's written notice and copies of the bills are provided to the
adverse party. Id. at (III) (G) (4). Evidence may be taken by affidavit or written
report, and hearsay evidence is admissible. Id. at (III) (F). "A further example of
the suspension of normal rules of evidence is that most testimony before a Board of
Arbitration is taken in narrative form, rather than question and answer form. These
departures from normal courtroom procedures result in a substantial saving of time.
An average case is heard in one and a half hours, and even complex cases generally
take only three or four hours." JuDuIcAL CoUNcI. ARBITRATION STUDY, note 41 supra,
at 39.
91. Id. at (III)(F).
92. Id. at (III)(G).
93. Id. at (IV)(A).
94. Id. at (VI)(B),(C).
95. Arbitrators found for the plaintiff in 67% of the cases compared to the 71%
rate experienced in Philadelphia. An interesting statistic, unavailable from other juris-
dictions studied, is that the appeal rate for plaintiffs and defendants is identical (50%).
Compare Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P. Arbitration Report, note 96 infra with JUDICIAL
CouNcIL. ARBITRATION SrUDY, note 41 supra, at 33.
96. Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P. Arbitration Report (Dec. 31, 1976) (on file with
the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P. Arbitration
Report].
97. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
98. See note 82 & accompanying text supra.
99. Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P. Arbitration Report, note 96 supra.
100. See note 66 and accompanying text supra. In Cleveland the high appeal rate
of arbitrated cases compared to the few actually tried de novo may indicate that appeal
is often taken to force negotiation of the arbitration award. Just as in Phildelphia and
Rochester, there are minor disincentives to appeal. See Omo RExv. CODE ANN.,
CUYAHOGA COUNTY CT. C.P.R. 29(VI) (Page 1974).
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attempts by litigants to coerce more favorable settlements by a threat
of prolonged court litigation. More serious dissatisfaction with the
general trend of decisions would be demonstrated by a higher rate
of appealed decisions actually moving to trial.
Although usage of the Cuyahoga County program has been signi-
ficantly more limited than the comparable compulsory arbitration pro-
grams in Philadelphia and Rochester,' 0 ' this limited usage may be
attributed to the relatively low jurisdictional amount of $5,000 in
Cleveland,10 2 as opposed to $10,000 in Philadelphia.' 0 3  Nevertheless,
the program has generated sufficient support to produce a proposal in
January 1977 that the compulsory arbitration jurisdiction be increased
to $10,000, in an effort to expand its beneficial impact.1
0 4
Judicial Arbitration in California
In California, judicial arbitration exists in three forms: voluntary,
in which the parties voluntarily stipulate to arbitration of a pending
suit; compulsory, in which arbitration is imposed on the parties in
pending litigation within certain categories similar to the Philadelphia
procedure; and hybrid, in which, if the plaintiff elects arbitration, the
defendant is compelled to arbitrate.
Voluntary Form: The Los Angeles Plan
Many local California bar associations have adopted voluntary
judicial arbitration procedures. The Los Angeles Attorneys' Special
Arbitration Plan, initiated in 1971, is the oldest and most widely
copied. 0 5
The Los Angeles program, and voluntary arbitration plans in
general, are much closer in form to traditional arbitration than are
the compulsory judicial arbitration plans. Under the Los Angeles
voluntary plan submission of a case to arbitration is by stipulation of
the parties and is entirely their responsibility.'0 6 As a result, there
is only a limited right of appeal, which, unlike the compulsory plans,
101. 14% of the civil docket was referred to arbitration during 1976, compared
to 66% in Philadelphia during the January-November 1976 period. Cuyahoga County
Ct. C.P. Arbitration Report, supra note 96.
102. See note 87 & accompanying text supra.
103. See note 45 & accompanying text supra.
104. Civil Court Committee's proposed modification of Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P.R.
29 (Jan. 4, 1977) (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
105. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL ARBITRATION STY, note 41 supra; Halperin, note 34
supra, at 473. The plan was initiated by a Joint Committee of the Southern Cali-
fornia Trial Lawyers Association and the Association of Southern California Defense
Counsel. Id. at 18.
106. JUDICIAL COUNCIL ARBITRATION STUDY, note 41 supra, at 18.
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is outside normal civil justice channels.10 7  The voluntary program,
therefore, closely resembles traditional arbitration in two of its three
basic elements.' 08 The primary difference is that the arbitrator is
chosen randomly by the local superior court administrator from a list
of volunteer attorneys active in the trial bar'0 9 instead of by the
parties.110 This selection is the extent of the superior court's involve-
ment.
The arbitrator is required to set a hearing no sooner than twenty
days nor later than eighty days from the date of notification."' The
conduct of the hearing is determined by the arbitrator, 1 2 and the
rules of evidence are observed but are relaxed."13 The arbitrator has
thirty days to render an award." 4  Appeal is limited to a petition for
reconsideration, and upon agreement by the arbitrator and a grievance
committee, a decision or award may be reduced, increased, changed,
or set aside to be heard by another arbitrator."15 Most decisions by
the arbitrator are final because such petitions are rare.1 6
Performance - The Los Angeles voluntary arbitration plan has
produced positive results on a small scale. From the results of a 1972
study, this procedure appears to achieve the objectives of speed,"1
economy," 8 and fairness. Litigant satisfaction appears high. During
the period of this 1972 study, grievances were filed in only two cases,
or one percent of arbitrated cases."19 In addition, the study found
107. See note 115 & accompanying text infra.
108. See notes 35-36 & accompanying text supra.
109. JurmciAL CouNcm AR~rrnATXoN STuDy, note 41 supra, at 18-19. "The ar-
bitrator selected cannot be challenged peremptorily." Id. The administrator also
notifies the party of the arbitration hearing, handles requests for continuances, and
provides the arbitrator with the necessary documents for the hearing. Id.
110. See notes 35-36 & accompanying text supra.
111. JUDmL CouNcm ARsrrmAToN S-uy, note 41 supra, at 19.
112. Id.
113. Id. As is the case with other judicial arbitration plans to be discussed, med-
ical records are admissible if furnished to opposing counsel one week prior to the
hearing. The author of the document may be called as a witness and examined as if
under cross-examination. Similarly police accident reports may be offered into evidence
without foundation. Id.
114. Id.
115. The grievance committee is composed of two attorneys, a plaintiff's attorney
and a defense attorney, who serve one year without fee. Petition for reconsideration
may be made only on very narrow grounds: 1) conflict of interest, 2) fraud, or 3)
an error on a clearly defined question of law which affects the ultimate decision on
liability or amount of damages. JUDICiAL CouNcm ARarrmATxoN STUDY, note 41 supra,
at 19-21.
116. Id. at 21.
117. "The arbitration program has no backlog ........ Id.
118. Id. at 22, 78.
119. Id. at 21.
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a high correlation between the distribution pattern of awards under
the voluntary arbitration plan and the verdict pattern found in similar
cases tried to a jury in the first half of 1972.120
The Los Angeles plan, however, has had little impact on civil case
backlog as the number of voluntary stipulations to arbitrate has re-
mained relatively low. Despite the apparent satisfaction of those par-
ticipating, 121 the number of voluntary stipulations to arbitrate never
has grown beyond 500 cases per year. 1 22  At this level there will be no
impact on backlog because 500 cases per year represents only one
percent of pending cases in Los Angeles County superior court.
2 3
In other California counties having a similar voluntary arbitration pro-
cedure, utilization was even lower than in Los Angeles County.
1 24
Because the delivery of effective justice through the voluntary plan
appears to be comparable to that achieved through compulsory judicial
arbitration elsewhere, it seems reasonable to conclude that the low
utilization of the program results almost entirely from its voluntary
nature.
Compulsory Form: Santa Clara County Superior Court
In March 1976 Santa Clara County adopted compulsory arbitra-
tion by local rule of court.125  The Santa Clara County Court Ordered
Arbitration Plan is part of a process involving a series of local innova-
tions that were designed to make the superior court more efficient.1
2
0
120. Id. at 21 (citing 15 JuRY VERDICTS WEEKLY, nos. 1-26 (1971)). The plain-
tiff prevailed in 58% and the defendant in 42% of the arbitrated cases compared to a
63% to 37% pattern found in similar cases tried to a jury.
121. The overwhelming majority (94%) of those attorneys aware of the procedure
but not participating also indicated they favored the principle of judicial arbitration
for resolution of small personal injury disputes. JUDICIAL COUNCIL ARBITRATION STUDY,
note 41 supra, at 74.
122. Halperin, note 34 supra, at 473 n.12.
123. 1977 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, note 7 supra, at 208.
124. Halperin, note 34 supra, at 473 n.12.
125. SANTA CLARA COUNTY SUPERIOR CT. R. 23. "This rule is adopted pursuant
to the inherent power of the Court to regulate its trial calendar and in accordance with
Rule 5.3(9) [Mandatory Settlement Conference in all jury cases] of the Local Rules
of this Court." Id.
Arbitration is also available to litigants under this local rule on a voluntary basis
in two ways. First, the parties may stipulate to binding arbitration under the pro-
cedures administered by the local bar association with rules similar to the Los Angeles
Attorneys Special Arbitration Plan. Second, the parties may stipulate to binding ar-
bitration and waive the right to trial de novo. SANTA CLARA SUPER. CT. R. 23 § 1.3
(B) (2). However, virtually all cases arbitrated under this new procedure in Santa
Clara were court ordered in 1976. Interview with Judge John E. Longinotti, Presiding
Judge of Santa Clara County Superior Court, in San Jose (Nov. 4, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as 1976 Longinotti interview].
126. 1976 Longinotti interview, note 125 supra.
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As part of this process, mandatory settlement conferences are required
in all jury-bound cases. 127  In the conference attorneys act as judges
pro tempore to assist counsel for the litigants in arriving at a realistic
case value.1 28  If a traditional settlement is not accomplished during
the mandatory settlement conference, the judges pro tem put a value
on the case and recommend whether it is appropriate for arbitration
under the new compulsory arbitration rule.129  Assessing a number of
factors, the presiding judge then makes the decision whether to order
arbitration.13 0  Thus, judicial arbitration jurisdiction in Santa Clara
County, unlike the compulsory plans previously discussed, does not
depend upon a specific amount in controversy.
The Santa Clara rules provide for the random selection of a single
arbitrator,13 with no opportunity for the parties to challenge the
selection. 32  There is no provision for discovery. 3 3  The rules of evi-
dence governing civil actions apply to the conduct of the arbitration
hearing, with certain variations in the interest of simplicity. 3 4  In
127. SAvA CLARA CorNTY SunER. CT. R. 5.3.
128. 1976 Longinotti interview, note 125 supra.
129. Id.
130. Id. On a case evaluation form provided the presiding judge the attorneys
pro tem indicate: 1) the plaintiff's present demand and his lowest demand as well
as the defendant's present offer and his highest offer; 2) the probability of a settlement
before or during trial; and 3) the reasons why the case is appropriate or inappropriate
for arbitration. The criteria utilized by the presiding judge to determine whether or
not a case is suitable for arbitration is not spelled out in the rules. The presiding
judge, however, considers the recommendation of the pro tern judges, and indepen-
dently evaluates the seriousness, degree of injury, and complexity of the case. If there
is no serious injury, it is the "usual" personal injury case where there is simply a differ-
ence of opinion as to the valuation of the case, and the parties are not more than $2,000
to $3,000 apart, the judge will order arbitration. The order to arbitrate cases meeting
these criteria rests on the theory that this type of case will typically settle during trial
after consuming valuable judicial resources. In actual practice the presiding judge
orders arbitration in virtually all personal injury cases demanding less than $10,000.
1976 Longinotti interview, upra note 125; interview with Judge John E. Longinotti,
Presiding Judge of Santa Clara County Superior Court, in San Jose (Feb. 7, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1977 Longinotti interview].
131. SANTA CLAA CoUNTY SuPER. CT. R. 23 § 1.5.
132. Id. at § 1.5.
133. Id. at § 1.10.
134. Id. at § 1.11(B). Written medical and hospital reports, documentary evidence
of loss of income, and property damage repair bills may be introduced if copies have
been delivered to all the opposing parties at least ten days prior to the hearing. Id.
Any adverse party may subpoena the author of a report and examine him or her as if
under cross examination, unlike the Philadelphia rule, which requires court approval.
Compare SAT CLARA CoUNTY Summ. CT. R. 23 § 1.11(B)(1) with PHLADELPrsA
CT. C.P. ComxuPsoay A3rrRATioN R. III(E) (4) (a). The depositions of any witness,
including statements of opinion, may be offered and received in evidence if the state-
ment is made by affidavit or by declaration under the penalty of perjury and copies are
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general the arbitrator has most of the powers of the court, although,
unlike the Philadelphia rules, the powers of the arbitrator are limited
to those enumerated in the rules. 135  The arbitrator has ten days to
file an award following the hearing, 13 and the clerk of the court is
empowered to enter the award as a judgment if no party has filed a
motion to restore the case to the civil trial list within twenty days
after the award. 37  Any subsequent trial de novo must proceed as
if the arbitration proceedings had not occurred.' 38  The appellant is
not required to make any reimbursement for the cost of the arbitra-
tion proceedings, 8 9 nor is the court at trial de novo empowered to
award costs.'
40
Performance - Because the Santa Clara compulsory arbitration
plan did not become effective until March 1976, drawing firm con-
clusions would be premature. Thus far, however, available informa-
tion correlates closely with the good results achieved in other juris-
dictions discussed. Judge Longinotti, Presiding Judge of the Santa
Clara County Superior Court during 1976, concludes that compulsory
arbitration was responsible for the court's ability to meet its goal of
maintaining its relatively current elapsed time interval of six months
from at-issue to trial.' 4 ' The court was able to maintain its excellent
record by ordering only 270 cases to arbitration in 1976 because the
Santa Clara procedure focuses on time consuming jury-bound cases.
42
delivered to all opposing parties at least 10 days prior to hearing. The statement is
not admissible when an opposing party has, at least 5 days before the hearing, de-
livered to the proponent of the evidence a written demand that the witness be pro-
duced in person to testify at the hearing. SANTA CLARA COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 23
§ 1.11 (B) (2). The rules also provide that the deposition of any witness may be offered
by any party notwithstanding that the deponent is not "unavailable as a witness."
Id. § 1.11(B)(3). See CAL. EVID. CODE § 240 (West 1966) (defining unavailability
of a witness).
135. SANTA CLARA COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 23 § 1.9(E).
136. Id. § 1.12(B).
137. Id. § 1.13.
138. Id. § 1.15(C).
139. Id. § 1.15. Under Santa Clara's plan, the arbitrator serves without fee. Com-
pare SANTA CLARA COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 23 § 1.5 with CAL. R. CT. 1608 (West Supp.
1977).
140. Compare SANTA CLARA COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 23 § 1.15 with CAL. R. CT.
1616 (West Supp. 1977). Under CAL. R. CT. 1616(d) (West Supp. 1977), a trial
court shall deem the arbitration award to have been an offer within CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 998 (West Supp. 1977), not accepted by the party who requested trial de
novo.
141. 1977 Longinotti interview, note 130 supra. This objective was accomplished
even though three judges were transferred from civil departments to handle the sig-
nificantly increased criminal caseload during 1976. Id.
142. Memorandum from Judge John E. Longinotti to Santa Clara County Superior
Court Judges (Feb. 4, 1977) (on file with Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as
Longinotti memorandum].
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Of the 270 cases, only 24 were still pending as of January 27, 1977.143
Consequently, 246 cases, each within one week of trial, were perma-
nently removed from the courts in 1976.'4 Because approximately
half of these cases would ordinarily have settled before or during
trial,145 it is a fair estimate that arbitration saved the judicial resources
necessary for 123 full trials. The impact and scope of these 123 de-
flected jury-bound cases becomes even more significant when compared
to the number of contested personal injury and property damage cases
in Santa Clara County Superior Court. These 123 arbitrated cases
in 1976 were double the total number of contested personal injury and
property damage cases in the entire year of 1975-76.146
Given that the Santa Clara Superior Court had already established
a record of relative efficiency in disposing of civil cases, 147 the most
important factor in evaluating whether the new arbitration procedure
has succeeded in providing effective justice is whether the litigants
involved perceived it as being fair. Of the 246 arbitrated cases, only
13 percent (32) requested return to the trial calendar.148  This low
percentage takes on added significance in that the arbitrator's award
may be appealed without payment of any fee or threat of an award
of costs. 14 9 Further, 20 of these 32 cases settled without trial, with
only three going to trial and nine remaining on the trial calendar as
of January 31, 1977.150 Even if all nine pending cases eventually
reached trial, the result would be that only five percent of the arbi-
trated cases were tried de novo. Although the appeal rates for nine
months, considered independently, would not be very meaningful,
they gain in significance by their correlation with the twenty year
appeal rate experienced under the Philadelphia compulsory arbitration
rules.1
51
The impact of these statistics is cogently summarized by Judge
Longinotti:
[I]t can be validly stated that the court-administered arbitration
program initiated by the court in 1976 and conducted pursuant
to local rule 23 has been quite successful, and that those members
of the bar who have made the program function by accepting the





145. 1977 Longinotti interview, note 130 supra.
146. See 1977 JuxcrmCtL CouNCIL REPOnT, note 7 supra, at 258 (Table XIV).
147. See notes 17-18 & accompanying text supra.
148. Longinotti memorandum note 142 supra.
149. See notes 139-40 & accompanying text supra.
150. Longinotti memorandum, note 142 supra.
151. See notes 65-66 & accompanying text supra.
152. Longinotti memorandum, note 142 supra.
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To members of the bar, the comments of the immediate past president
of the Santa Clara Bar Association, Anthony J. Trepel, are instructive:
"[L]awyers were well satisfied with the arbitrator's decision . ..and
I would recommend adoption of the court ordered arbitration by other
California Superior Courts ... ,"153 After less than a year there
are strong positive quantitative and qualitative indications that the
Santa Clara Compulsory Arbitration rule has achieved the objective of
effective justice through fair and expeditious results.
Hybrid Form: Judicial Arbitration Statute
Although the concept of compulsory arbitration subject to retrial
has been adopted with demonstrable success in several other jurisdic-
tions, proposals for statewide adoption of a comparable program in
California have met with considerable resistance.15 4  California has
adopted a hybrid form of judicial arbitration distinct from both the
compulsory and voluntary types of judicial arbitration already dis-
cussed. The adoption of the hybrid form came as a result of legislative
compromise following the introduction of a bill sponsored by the Cali-
foria Judicial Council that would have provided for a compulsory
form of arbitration. 155
As originally sponsored, this legislation (S.B. 1211) would have
authorized local rules providing for compulsory arbitration in all per-
sonal injury cases in which special damages for medical expenses and
lost wages did not exceed $1,000, subject to trial de novo upon the
request of any litigant.15 This proposal of the Judicial Council was
153. Letter from Anthony J. Trepel, immediate past President of the Santa Clara
County Bar Association to R. J. Heher (Feb. 18, 1977) (on file with Hastings Law
Journal). Mr. Trepel also states "I believe in the cases involved, the arbitration was
satisfactory because the plaintiff and defendant could not reach agreement either through
client's failure to accept an appropriate amount or the failure to properly evaluate the
case. As we all know, there are a number of cases in which it is impossible for the
litigants or their counsel to resolve the issues and amounts and therefore it is necessary
that a disinterested third party make the decision." Id.
Satisfaction with the substantial fairness of the program is also expressed by D.
Gerald Brown, Chairman of the Santa Clara Bar Association Arbitration Committee.
"[The primary advantage ... is that the trial calendar is made available for those
cases which merit a jury trial based on the amount of damages involved and/or the
complexity of the matter being litigated. As a result, unlike many counties, the trial
calendar for civil matters in Santa Clara County is still manageable, . . . I most
definitely recommend adoption by the courts of such a proceeding and would make
no changes in the Rule 23 procedure ..... " Letter from D. Gerald Brown to R. J.
Heher (Feb. 22, 1977) (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
154. Halperin, note 34 supra, at 474.
155. S.B. 1211 (1973), as amended June 27, 1973.
156. Halperin, note 34 supra, at 474, referring to S.B. 1211 (1973), as amended
June 27, 1973. The bill would also have provided for voluntary arbitration of any
pending action upon stipulation of the parties and for the hybrid form of arbitration
where the plaintiff by electing compels the defendant to arbitrate.
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based on an exhaustive study of compulsory arbitration in other
states' 57 conducted pursuant to a 1971 Senate Resolution authorizing
the Judicial Council to investigate the possible role of arbitration
procedures in the judicial process.'3 8
The sources of resistance to S.B. 1211 as originally proposed are
unclear, because there is no legislative history of the bill nor any
official documentation of the objections to it. The Senate Committee
on Judiciary Digest and Comment on S.B. 1211 indicates that there
was no known opposition.3 9 The Assembly Committee on Judiciary
Digest and Comment indicates that the Los Angeles Trial Lawyers
Association opposed it, whereas the California Trial Lawyers Asso-
ciation took no position regarding the bill.16° Whatever the source of
resistance, the bill, as amended, eliminated the form of compulsory
arbitration of smaller personal injury cases proposed by the Judicial
Council. 6" The amended bill was eventually vetoed by Governor
Reagan on September 27, 1974. The same bill was reintroduced as
S.B. 983 on April 15, 1975, and ultimately signed into law by Governor
Brown on September 23, 1975.162
As finally enacted, the Judicial Arbitration Statute'0 3 does not
provide for statewide compulsory arbitration. Instead, it authorizes
the Judicial Council to promulgate rules providing for a unique hybrid
form of arbitration either by voluntary stipulaon of the parties or via
plaintiff's election of arbitration, which thereby compels the defendant
to arbitrate cases below $7,500 in value. 64 Thus it can be seen that
the Judicial Arbitration Statute is in character essentially a voluntary
157. JuDiciL . CouNcu ArBirrATiON STUDY, note 41 supra.
158. S. Res. 139, 1971 Reg. Sess., JouRNAL OF THE SENATE 2766. See note 9
supra. The study conducted pursuant to this resolution made the following findings:
"1) the courts of California are congested; 2) [mlost civil matters pending are personal
injury actions; 3) [t]he use of arbitration for smaller personal injury cases is acceptable
to the personal injury bar and the insurance industry; 4) [a] shift to arbitration of
smaller personal injury claims would substantially relieve court congestion in California
as it has in other jurisdictions; 5) [a]rbitration is able to produce a decision more
quickly than the superior courts in their present condition; 6) [ajrbitration functions
at a low cost to the public and to the litigants; 7) [alrbitration as a system to resolve
personal injury disputes is equal in quality to the courts, in that it is as reliable and
fair." JuDIcrAL CouNcm AnBrrnAnToN STuDy, note 41 supra, at 5. See also Senate
Committee on Judiciary, Bill Analysis of S.B. 1211, (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
159. Senate Committee on Judiciary, Bill Analysis of S.B. 1211 (on file with
Hastings Law Journal).
160. Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Bill Analysis of S.B. 1211 (on file with
Hastings Law Journal).
161. Compare S.B. 1211 (1973) as amended June 27, 1973 with S.B. 1211 (1973)
as amended Jan. 17, 1974.
162. 1975 Cal. Stats., c. 1006, effective July 1, 1976.
163. Id., codified as CAL. Civ. Pnoc. CoDE § 1141.10 (West Supp. 1977).
164. Id.
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program. Unlike voluntary arbitration procedures such as the Los
Angeles program, which are administered by local bar associations
according to rules governing arbitration by agreement, however, this
voluntary procedure is administered by the courts according to rules
adopted by the Judicial Council pursuant to the statute. 6 5
The Rules of Court'66 normally require that arbitration should
be elected or agreed to by stipulation after an at-issue memorandum
has been filed but before a trial date has been set. 67  A single arbi-
trator is selected at random from a pool of volunteer attorneys, 16 8 al-
though the rules encourage the parties to designate an arbitrator of
their own choosing.169 Unlike other jurisdictions outside California
the pool of volunteer arbitrators is composed of attorneys experienced
in personal injury litigation with additional panels for general practice
as the case volume warrants. 170 Another key difference is that the
parties have an opportunity to make a peremptory challenge to the
selection of the arbitrator. 171
Under the Judicial Council rules, as under the Philadelphia com-
pulsory arbitration procedure, the rules of evidence governing civil
actions apply but are relaxed to encourage the use of documentary
evidence. 17 2  The arbitrator is to determine all issues properly raised
by the pleadings and file an award within ten days of the hearing.
73
If no party files a request for trial de novo within twenty days, the
arbitrator's award is entered as a judgment. 7 4  This judgment has
the same effect as any other superior court judgment except that it
is not subject to appeal and may not be attacked or set aside except
on the express narrow grounds provided in the rules. 175
165. CAL. R. CT. 1601-17 (West Supp. 1977). These rules are very similar to
Santa Clara County Superior Court Rule 23. See notes 125-40 & accompanying text
supra.
166. For a more complete discussion and a preliminary guide to the California
rules, see Halperin, note 34 supra.
167. CAL. R. CT. 1602 (West Supp. 1977).
168. Id. at R. 1605(C).
169. Id. at R. 1602(b).
170. Id. at R. 1604.
171. Id. at R. 1605.
172. Compare CAL. R. CT. 1613(b) (West Supp. 1977) with PHILADELPHIA CT.
C.P. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION R. III(E) (1971).
173. CAL. R. CT. 1615 (West Supp. 1977).
174. Id. at R. 1615(C).
175. Id. Rule 1615(D) provides: "A party against whom a judgment is entered
pursuant to an arbitration award may, within six months after its entry, move to
vacate the judgment on the ground that the arbitrator was subject to a disqualification
not disclosed before the hearing and of which the arbitrator was then aware, or upon
one of the grounds set forth in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of Section 1286.2 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, and upon no other grounds. The motion shall be heard
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If a trial is requested and held following arbitration, no evidentiary
use may be made of any aspect of the arbitration proceedings.17 6 The
rules specifically incorporate Code of Civil Procedure section 998, pur-
suant to which the arbitration award is deemed to be an offer to accept
judgment by the nonappealing parties. 177  Therefore, after the trial
the court may consider the amount of the arbitration award, if any
was made, 7 8 and assess the additionally incurred costs against a re-
questing party whose position has not improved at trial.179
Performance - Because the California Judicial Arbitration Statute
has been in effect only since July 1976, it is too early to draw meaning-
ful conclusions regarding the effectiveness of this procedure. If stipu-
lation or election is made promptly and if the arbitrator is settled upon
quickly, the built-in time limits of the arbitration process should result
in speedier dispute resolution in those cases going to arbitration. The
reduction in time, produced in part by simplified rules of evidence,
should lead to considerably lower costs.
Statistics compiled for the first six months of the program's opera-
tion appear to indicate a positive initial response on the part of litigants
to the fairness of the proceedings. The rate of appeal to trial de novo
following arbitration hearings has been low; in only 13 percent of cases
in which arbitrator's awards were filed during the six month period was
there an appeal to trial de novo. 80 This rate is comparable to the
appeal rates obtained in Philadelphia (8 percent to 12 percent), 181
Rochester (8 percent),' 8 2 and Santa Clara (13 percent). 8  The cor-
relation to the Santa Clara appeal rate is particularly significant be-
cause the Santa Clara plan does not require the payment of any fee
upon notice to the adverse parties and to the arbitrator, and may be granted only upon
clear and convincing evidence that the grounds alleged are true, and that the motion
was made as soon as practicable after the moving party learned of the existence of
those grounds."
176. Id. at R. 1616(c).
177. Id. at R. 1616(d).
178. Id.
179. CAL. Civ. Pnoc. CoDE § 998 (West Supp. 1977). At the discretion of the
court these costs could include expert witness fees in the preparation of the case for
trial. Id. See Halperin, supra note 34, at 521-22. These costs, if significant, could
become an impediment to requests for a trial de novo.
180. California Judicial Council Special Report on Arbitration Proceedings (July-
December 1976) (on fle with Hastings Law Journal). During the first six months
plaintiffs elected and thus compelled defendants to arbitrate under the California Ju-
dicial Arbitration Statute in 81% of the total number of cases placed on the arbitra-
tion hearing list under the hybrid form of judicial arbitration. The balance (19%)
was comprised of voluntary stipulations. Id.
181. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
182. See note 82 & accompanying text supra.
183. See note 148 & accompanying text supra.
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nor allow the assessment of costs upon appeal to trial de novo.18 4  The
similarity of appeal rates tends to discount the possible influence that
the threat of an assessment of costs at trial may have in discouraging
requests for trial following arbitration under the Judicial Arbitration
Statute.18 5
With regard to the effect the program has had in improving the
efficiency of the civil justice system generally, the results to date must
be considered minimal. Approximately 2,200 cases were arbitrated
in all California superior courts from July to December 1976.186 Not
unexpectedly, the number of arbitrations during the first six months
amounted to a small percentage of contested civil matters statewide.
Familiarity with judicial arbitration, however, appears to be a
factor in its acceptance. The procedure under the Judicial Arbitration
Statute became more widely used each successive month for the first
six months under this plan.187 The proposition that familiarity will
produce greater usage is supported by another statistic from the first
six month period: over half of all the arbitrated cases were in one
court system, Los Angeles County Superior Court,"8 where the bar
had for some time prior to the enactment of the Judicial Arbitration
Statute maintained a successful, if only moderately utilized, voluntary
judicial arbitration system.18 9
The signs that arbitration under the California Judicial Arbitration
Statute will be capable of delivering effective justice, combined with
the increasing familiarity and utilization of the program by the prac-
ticing bar, are encouraging portents for the eventual success of the
statute. Nevertheless, it appears probable that such success will be
tempered by the essentially voluntary nature of the program. It would
seem unrealistic to expect that a procedure relying on the initiative
of litigants will achieve the level of usage attained by compulsory
judicial arbitration.
Benefits of Judicial Arbitration - A Summary
The primary objective of an effective judicial system is to dispense
justice inexpensively and fairly without delay.19° Judicial arbitration
184. See notes 139-40 & accompanying text supra.
185. See note 179 & accompanying text supra.
186. California Judicial Council Special Report on Arbitration Proceedings (July-
December 1976) (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
187. Telephone interview with Alexander B. Yakutis, Judicial Council of California
Attorney (Feb. 4, 1977).
188. See note 186 & accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 117-24 & accompanying text supra.
190. See note 4 supra.
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is capable of delivering effective justice through satisfaction of these
goals.
Speed - In the jurisdictions discussed, the time limits imposed
directly upon the various steps in the arbitration process keep the
average elapsed time from at-issue memorandum filing to arbitration
decision well below the six month target objective. In the jurisdictions
keeping such records, the average elapsed time from at-issue memo-
randum filing to decision has been between sixty and ninety days.191
Moreover, by reducing civil case backlog through the removal of less
complicated cases, judicial arbitration hastens the movement of major
cases remaining on the civil active list to trial and resolution. The
rising number of backlogged cases in California superior courts, three
times the number of backlogged cases ten years ago, 192 would appear
to militate in favor of adoption of a procedure with ability to reduce
this backlog.
Economy - Judicial arbitration lowers expenses to private litigants
through reduced pre-trial preparation,'93 simplified evidentiary pro-
cedures, and elimination of certain stages of the traditional jury trial
procedure. 94 Reduced expense makes it economically more feasible
for parties to enforce justified claims and defend against both legitimate
and nuisance actions in relatively uncomplicated cases. Reduced cost
may also help explain the low rate of appeal from arbitrated decisions
demonstrated in most jurisdictions utilizing the procedure. As long
as litigants find the proceedings essentially fair, they may view slightly
higher or lower awards than they believe a jury would have returned
as representing a net gain owing to the lower costs involved.
The savings to the public is also potentially significant. For ex-
ample, one study estimated the public cost per trial in 1970 to be $2,194
without jury fees, while at approximately the same time the cost per
award under the Philadelphia compulsory arbitration system was
$106.195 If the Philadelphia experience over twenty years is indicative,
these savings will not be confined to the implementation stage but can
be expected in each succeeding year. 96
191. See notes 63 & 78 supra.
192. See note 19 supra.
193. A survey conducted by the Judicial Council found that attorneys in the Los
Angeles Attorneys' Special Arbitration Plan estimated that they spent 6.5 hours pre-
paring for arbitration versus 13.4 hours preparing for a jury trial, and spent 2.5 hours
in arbitration versus 3.3 days conducting a jury trial. JuDiciAL Cotrlcr. ABBrrRAT oN
STuDY, note 41 supra at 78-79.
194. But see note 179 & accompanying text supra.
195. JuDicrAL CourNcm ArnwIATION STUDY, note 41, supra at 78.
196. Compiled Materials on the Philadelphia Compulsory Arbitration Plan, note 43
supra, at 53.
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Fairness - Litigant satisfaction with the fairness of arbitration has
been indicated by the comparability of appeal rates from arbitration
awards with the rate of appeal from all California superior courts in
civil cases. 197  Appeal rates from arbitration awards to trial de novo
have ranged from 8 percent to 25 percent with most jurisdictions
averaging between 11 and 13 percent, 198 as compared with the 11 to
14 percent rate of appeal from all contested civil cases in California
superior court.199 Moreover, the majority of the appeals to trial de
novo settle before trial so that in most jurisdictions only 5 to 6 percent
of arbitrated cases are retried de novo.200 Although fees charged upon
appeal in some jurisdictions might deter appeal by some litigants, be-
cause such fees are typically nominal, low appeal rates from judicial
arbitration awards would seem to indicate that over 90 percent of
arbitrated cases produce results acceptable to the parties.
An additional index of fairness is that arbitration awards have
been comparable to the results a judge or jury would deliver upon
similar facts. The experiences in Philadelphia and Los Angeles indi-
cates that arbitrators find for the plaintiff slightly more frequently than
juries and that damage awards are substantially the same as jury ver-
dicts in similar kinds of cases. 201  An independent experimental study
has strikingly confirmed that this similarity in results is in all likelihood
typical rather than exceptional.20 2  The widespread participation of
attorneys in the programs discussed, as well as the predominant use
of compulsory arbitration in Philadelphia after almost twenty years,
20 3
are signs that both bench and bar are also convinced of the substantial
fairness of arbitration procedures.
197. See note 31 & accompanying text supra.
198. Philadelphia (8-12%); Rochester (11%); Cleveland (25%); Santa Clara
(13%); California Judicial Arbitration Statute (13%). See notes 65, 82, 96, 148 &
180, supra.
199. See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
200. Philadelphia (5%); Rochester (1%); Cleveland (3%) and Santa Clara
(5%). See notes 66, 82, 99 & 150 supra.
201. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL ARBITRATION STrUDY, note 41 supra, at 21, 33.
202. Aksen, Arbitration of Automobile Accident Cases, 1 CONN. L. REv. 70, 89-91
(1968). This study was conducted by the Columbia University Project for Effective
Justice. As part of this study, a motion picture of an arbitration hearing was pre-
pared and shown to 32 New York civil court judges, 160 attorneys, and 32 mock juries.
100% of the judges, 84% of the juries, and 87% of the attorneys found for the plain-
tiff. The judges delivered an average award of $2,907 and the attorneys and juries
delivered identical average awards ($2,178). Because the attorneys would normally
serve as arbitrators, this study concludes that the arbitration results in smaller personal
injury cases would be the same as if the case were tried before a jury.
203. 71% of all civil cases in Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas were arbi-
trated in 1975. PHILADELPHIA COMMON PLEAS & MUNICIPAL COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
1 (1975).
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In addition to meeting the objective standards proposed for meas-
uring the ability of judicial arbitration to deliver effective justice, rea-
sonable speculation discloses other likely, but difficult to quantify,
benefits to the administration of justice. First, there should be sub-
stantial improvement in the quality of _judicial decisionmaking with
the reduced pressure afforded by a more current calendar. Second,
producing faster, less expensive dispute resolution should eliminate
some of the protracted anxiety felt by many litigants today. Faster
resolution will enable litigants to end more quickly a traumatic incident
and to plan for their future with greater certainty, especially in personal
injury cases. Third, factfinding accuracy will be improved because
dispute resolution will occur closer to the incident involved. Fourth,
the fairness of the settlement climate will be augmented because high
costs and court congestion could no longer be used as a bargaining
tool. This consideration takes on great importance in a civil justice
system in which most cases settle prior to trial.
Judicial arbitration also commends itself to the bar on the basis
of pure self interest. First, it presents an opportunity to improve the
public's image of the legal community. The success of judicial arbi-
tration is largely made possible by the interest and energy of volunteer
attorney arbitrators. Attorney action of this kind could make a posi-
tive impact on a public highly frustrated by the congestion and cost
of current civil litigation.
Second, as a matter of law office economics, the substantially re-
duced preparation and hearing time, as compared with a typical jury
trial,20 will allow attorneys to be more efficient and enable them to
represent litigants more profitably and expeditiously in cases in which
the amount in controversy is low.
In sum, it is submitted that increased utilization of judicial arbi-
tration in low value, uncomplicated cases would represent a positive
step toward increasing public satisfaction with the administration of
justice. Judicial arbitration is not the only innovation capable of im-
proving the administration of justice.20 5 It is a particularly desirable
204. See e.g., note 193 & accompanying text supra.
205. One of the most recent important and comprehensive alternatives to current
civil litigation procedures is the adoption of a pilot program by the California legis-
lature whereby courts would use extremely simplified rules of procedure in non-jury
cases valued below $25,000. In recognition of the inordinately high cost of litigating
smaller civil cases in California, the legislature provided the following guidelines for
the Judicial Council in developing rules for the pilot program: 1) the elimination of
all discovery except for the requirement that each party file a statement of witnesses
to be called and physical evidence to be introduced; 2) elimination of pre-trial con-
ferences; 3) elimination of most demurrers and pre-trial motions; 4) the permissive
rather than required use of trial briefs; and 5) provision for narrative testimony and
written submission. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDE § 1823 (West Supp. 1977).
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alternative, however, because it is capable of attaining speed, economy,
and fairness without requiring radical innovations in either substantive
or procedural law. The substantive law upon which arbitration de-
cisions are based remains unchanged. Traditional trial procedures are
retained in a greatly streamlined form; judicial arbitration is not com-
petitive with, but supplemental to court procedure. It preserves the
right to a trial de novo by jury and is ultimately subject to supervision
by the courts. It is open to question whether other alternatives to
traditional civil litigation have the capacity simultaneously to meet
the objective requirements for the delivery of effective justice and
maintain substantive and procedural continuity with the law as it
currently stands.
20 6
While these revised procedures would reduce costs, the long-term impact on court
congestion may not be substantial because these procedures are limited to non-jury
cases. If there is a positive impact on congestion, most California courts will not
benefit in the near future because this pilot test is limited to two superior and two
municipal courts for a three year period. Nevertheless it illustrates the legislative
concern over the high cost and protracted delay of civil litigation in California and an
awareness that it may not only be unnecessary but illogical to utilize the same rules
of civil procedure for uncomplicated cases as for major, complex ones.
Among the other major alternatives are the following: 1) additional judicial re-
sources. See, e.g., Interview with Chief Justice Warren Burger, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Dec. 14, 1970, at 32; American Bar Association Special Committee on Automobile
Accident Reparations Report (Jan. 1969) (reprinted in 2 CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT STUDY COMMISSION REPORT part 2, at 68 (Dec. 1970)); Keeton,
Resolving Negligence Claims in Non-Judicial Forums, 10 FoaR 771, 783-92 (1975);
2) the pretrial conference; see, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON COURT CONGESTION, TEN CURES FOR COURT CONGESTION, (1959); Kincaid, Pre-trial
Conference Procedure in California, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 377 (1957); 3) 1 F. Klein, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE COURTS 529-33 (1976); state automobile compen-
sation boards, see, e.g., FRENCH, THE AUTOMOBILE COMPENSATION PLAN (1933); L.
GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS (1959); Bentley, Commission Trials, 34 CAL. ST. B.J. 413
(1959); Coie, Is Compulsory Insurance a Remedy?, 1 DUKE B.A.J. 23 (1933); Com-
pensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 785 (1932);
James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents, 59 COLUuM. L.
REV. 408 (1959); James & Law, Compensation for Automobile Accident Victims, 26
CONN. B. J. 70 (1952); Lewis, The Merits of the Automobile Accident Compensation
Plan, 3 L. & CONTEMP. PnoB. 583 (1936); Marks, The Curse of the Personal Injury Suit
and a Remedy, 10 A.B.A.J. 493 (1924); 4) no fault automobile insurance. The vari-
ations on the best known Keeton-O'Connell Plan are innumerable. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the plan, see, INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, PROTECTION FOR
THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1967). For the California Variation on the Keeton-O'Connell
no-fault plan, see A.B. 500 (1975) introduced January 16, 1975 during the regular
session of the legislature (unenacted); and 5) the abolition of civil jury trials see, e.g.,
L. GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS (1958); J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); Sarpy, Civil
Juries: Their Decline and Eventual Fall, 11 Loy. L. REV. 243 (1963).
206. Adding judicial manpower is still only a partial solution because it does not
address the objectives of reducing the expense and simplifying procedures in lower value
civil cases. In any case, precedent indicates that any increase is unlikely to be sufficient
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Adoption of Compulsory Arbitration by Local Rule of Court
in California
California's adoption of the essentially voluntary judicial Arbi-
tration Statute is a clear recognition of and a significant step toward
the foreseeable benefits offered by judicial arbitration. Voluntary
arbitration, however, will most likely have a less positive impact on
judicial efficiency than the compulsory judicial arbitration procedures
in other jurisdictions. Although California's new essentially voluntary
statutory form of judicial arbitration has demonstrated encouraging
results in its first six months, there are compelling reasons why the
legislature should replace voluntary with compulsory arbitration. °7
For these reasons, in the absence of legislation, local courts should
follow the lead of the Santa Clara Superior Court and adopt compul-
sory arbitration by local rule.
to overcome rising demand. The Administrative Office of the California Courts indicates
that the worsening condition of the civil calendar in 1974-75 "appears to have resulted
primarily from the abnormal number of judicial vacancies and from delays in creating
new judicial positions as they are needed." See note 20 supra, at 109. An extensive
study of the pre-trial conference concluded that it does achieve fairer results by im-
proving preparation and narrowing issues for trial but that it also actually prolongs
total time involved in most civil cases. See Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status,
Causes and Proposed Remedies, in REPORT OF THE 27TH AMRICAN ASSEMBLY, THE
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAwV ExPLoSION 29, 50 (1965). The State Automobile
Compensation Board is a radical innovation in which the traditional law of negligence
would be replaced by absolute liability covered by a compulsory insurance scheme and
removed from the courts entirely. Not surprisingly, such a dramatic change in sub-
stantive and procedural law has met with stiff resistance. See Wergel, Preliminary Re-
port on Plans for Inquiry into the Wisdom of a California Accident Commission, 34 CAL.
ST. B.J. 393 (1959). Although it is difficult to generalize about proposals for no-fault
automobile accident insurance, it has undergone much criticism. See, e.g., Green,
Basic Protection and Court Congestion, 52 A.B.A.J. 926 (1966); Knepper, Alimony for
Accident Victims?, 15 DEF. L.J. 513 (1966); Marryott, The Tort System and Automobile
Claims, 52 A.B.A.J. 639 (1966); Cone, The Keeton-O'Connell Monstrosity, reprinted in
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VicrTim 161 (1967). The most pertinent criticism is that
even the most popular variation of no-fault insurance would in fact tend to increase
congestion in the courts. Green, Basic Protection and Court Congestion, 52 A.B.A.J.
926, 931 (1966). The proposed abolition of the civil jury is the most radical innova-
tion of all and appears to have only negligible support.
207. See note 186 & accompanying text supra. The legislature is currently con-
sidering a bill that would repeal the voluntary Judicial Arbitration Statute (CAL. Civ.
Paoc. CODE § 1141.0 (West Supp. 1977). See note 245 & accompanying text supra.
S.B. 1362 (1978), introduced on January 3, 1978, would also require compulsory
judicial arbitration of all civil cases involving less than $15,000. S.B. 1362 (1978)
is patterned after the compulsory plans discussed in this Note. This proposed legis-
lation would, however, provide for stronger disincentives to appeal from an arbitra-
tion award to trial de novo than other compulsory procedures. See notes 57, 58, 82,
100, 140 & accompanying text supra. S.B. 1362 (1978) would require the party
electing trial de novo to pay the costs of arbitration, including compensation of the
arbitrator. These costs would not be recoverable by the prevailing party at a trial
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Superiority of Compulsory Form
Compulsory judicial arbitration is superior to the voluntary form.
First, the most practical benefit of a compulsory arbitration procedure
is that it would circumvent the predictable caution of some members
of the bar toward an innovation that promises to deflect a substantial
number of cases from the courts..2 08  Despite the demonstrated success
of judicial arbitration, many members of the bar are likely to take a
"wait and see" attitude. Unless the bar is compelled to arbitrate,
past experience indicates that the bar will require a prolonged period
to become convinced of the benefits of judicial arbitration. There is
evidence of this behavior in both the Pennsylvania and Los Angeles
experiences with judicial arbitration. In Pennsylvania some members
of the bar initially resisted compulsory arbitration and challenged it
in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.20 9  Today, after almost twenty
years of experience, 6,000 attorneys in Philadelphia alone now belong
to the pool of volunteer arbitrators.2 10  The Los Angeles Attorneys
Special Arbitration Plan, completely voluntary in nature, generated
only limited usage in the initial four years prior to the adoption of the
Judicial Arbitration Statute. Despite the strong favorable reaction
among those attorneys participating in the program,- 11 only about 500
cases per year went to arbitration in Los Angeles prior to the adoption
of the Judicial Arbitration Statute..21 2  Attempts to promote a com-
parable program in San Francisco fared notably less well..2
13
de novo: "In addition to the costs of arbitration, if the judgment upon the trial de
novo is not more favorable to the party electing the trial de novo than the arbitration
award by at least 20 percent of the award, the party electing the trial de novo shall
pay actual costs to the other party. Actual costs shall include all costs and fees tax-
able in any civil action, plus reasonable witness fees and attorney's fees not otherwise
taxable unless the court finds that the award of attorney's fees and witness fees would
create a substantial hardship upon the party electing the trial de novo or is not in
the interest of justice. Costs shall accrue from the time of the election for the trial
de novo." The proposed legislation would not become operative until January 1, 1980.
208. Illustrations of this cautiousness include the relatively slow adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the states and opposition to such other changes as
arbitration by contractual agreement, uninsured motorist arbitration, pretrial practice
rules, and medical malpractice arbitration. This resistance may also explain why the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated in 1938, were the last significant change
in judicial procedure. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
209. See note 263 & accompanying text infra.
210. Horwitz speech, note 49 supra, at 5.
211. In addition, the overwhelming majority (94%) of those attorneys aware of the
procedure but not participating indicated they favored the principle of judicial arbitra-
tion for resolution of small personal injury disputes. Judicial Council Arbitration Study,
note 41 supra, at 74.
212. Halperin, note 34 supra, at 473 n.12.
213. "For example, in calendar 1975 only 10 stipulations for arbitration were filed
in San Francisco .... .. Halperin, note 34 supra, at 473 n.12.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
January 19781 COMPULSORY JUDICIAL ARBITRATION 507
Second, it is only to be expected that the disputants themselves
may tend to resist using procedures different from those they expect
to encounter upon becoming involved in civil litigation. The litigant's
image of judge and jury may be difficult to replace by the idea of a
volunteer attorney serving as arbitrator. Furthermore, unlike mem-
bers of the bar, individual litigants will not be able to sample judicial
arbitration and thereafter engage in arbitration with confidence in its
capabilities. For most litigants, the particular dispute involved will
be their only contact with the civil justice system. Compulsory arbi-
tration in many cases may be the most practical way to introduce liti-
gants to the superiority of judicial arbitration in uncomplicated civil
cases.
Third, compulsory arbitration will produce an early and more
dramatic reduction in court backlog and delay than an essentially
voluntary procedure..2 14  An earlier reduction in civil case backlog
is a significant benefit because the severe delay and backlog in the
California superior courts is expected to increase in the future.215
Fourth, adoption of compulsory arbitration by local rule would
provide each superior court with a flexible procedure that could be
tailored to the specific needs of an individual court and modified
according to the dictates of experience.
210
In sum, experience from other jurisdictions demonstrates that
compulsory judicial arbitration is capable of producing effective justice
and alleviating crowded court calendars.2 17 Compulsory arbitration
in California should be more effective in relieving court congestion
than the essentially voluntary procedure promulgated under the Judi-
cial Arbitration Statute. For these reasons all California superior
courts with elapsed time from at-issue memorandum filing to trial
214. Compare notes 122 & accompanying text supra with notes 60 & 146 supra.
215. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
216. See, for example, note 130 supra.
217. Federal legislation has been introduced that would create compulsory judicial
arbitration of specified civil cases in five to eight United States district courts for a
three year test period. (H.R. 9778, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REc. H11,729
(1977)). H.R. 9778 (1977) would also authorize any district court to adopt volun-
tary judicial arbitration by local rule of court. As a means of generating data for
Congress to review in considering H.R. 9778 (1977), three U.S. district courts (N.D.
Cal., Conn., E.D. Pa.) plan to adopt a one year pilot plan of compulsory judicial ar-
bitration. These plans have been adopted by rule of court to be in operation by
April 1, 1978. Telephone interview with Jay Schaefer, Administrative Assistant Law
Clerk, United States District Court N.D. Cal. (Feb. 8, 1978).
Both the Defense Research Institute and the American Trial Lawyers Association
have endorsed compulsory arbitration. Judicial Council Arbitration Study, note 41
supra, at 50-52.
greater than the six month Judicial Council guideline 218 should be
encouraged to adopt compulsory arbitration by local rule.
Possible Constitutional and Statutory Obstacles
Local Court Authority
Ultimate procedural rulemaking authority in California resides
in the legislature2 " as derived from Article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution, which authorizes the Judicial Council to "adopt
rules of court administration, practice and procedure not inconsistent
with statute .... "2.,0 In several instances the legislature has dele-
gated rulemaking power to the Judicial Council 221 so that these rules
prevail notwithstanding any other provision of law.22 2  One such legis-
lative delegation is California Code of Civil Procedure section 575,
which authorizes the Judicial Council to "promulgate rules governing
pre-trial conferences, and the time, manner and nature thereof .. .,223
Pursuant to this authority, the Judicial Council has promulgated ex-
tensive pre-trial practice rules for California superior courts. 224  This
Note contends that these pre-trial rules provide California superior
courts with the authority to adopt compulsory arbitration as part of
mandatory settlement procedures..22 5
218. See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
219. Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 442-43, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (1929);
Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 414, 432, 238 P.
687, 694 (1925); Wright v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. 469, 473-74, 73 P. 145, 147 (1903).
B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, COURTS § 114 (2d ed. 1970); J. PARNESS, A STUDY
OF THE PROCEDURAL RULE-,MIAKING POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (1973).
220. (West Supp. 1977). Before the revision of this article "the Constitution form-
erly referred to 'rules of practice and procedure.' The revised provision adds the words
'court administration' . . . [which is] the basis for the innovation of recommended
'Standards of Judicial Administration.'" 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, CoURTS,
§ 119, at 390 (2d ed. 1970) (quoting CAL. R. CT. app., div. I).
221. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 901 (West Supp. 1977), (rules governing
appellate courts in civil actions); CAL. Civ. CODE § 4001 (West 1970) (practice and
procedure under the Family Law Act); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 575 (West Supp. 1977)
(rules governing pre-trial procedure).
222. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McKim, 6 Cal. 3d 673, 678 n.4, 493 P.2d 868, 870,
100 Cal. Rptr. 140, 142 (1972) "The practical effect of section 4001, therefore, is to
remove any restraints of statutory consistency on the Judicial Council's rules of practice
and procedure under the Family Law Act." Id.
223. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 575 (West Supp. 1977) provides in its entirety that
"The Judicial Council may promulgate rules governing pre-trial conferences, and the
time, manner and nature thereof, in civil cases at-issue, or in one or more classes thereof,
in the superior courts and in the municipal courts." (emphasis added).
224. CAL. R. CT. 206-49 (West Supp. 1977).
225. Santa Clara County Superior Court followed this procedure. See note 125 &
accompanying text supra.
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Preemption
The threshold question that must be answered is whether the
enactment by the legislature of the Judicial Arbitration Statute has
preempted the field of judicial arbitration in California.226 If there
has been such preemption, compulsory arbitration could not be imple-
mented by either the Judicial Council or local rule. Absent preemp-
tion, and with an alternative source of authority, local courts could
proceed in the direction of compulsory arbitration.
The Judicial Arbitration Statute should be construed as a state-
ment of intent by the legislature, rather than an attempt to preempt
the field of judicial arbitration. Although in the form of an authoriza-
tion, it seems reasonable to view the statute as intended to encourage
'the Judicial Council to experiment with a judicial arbitration program.
The restraint of the legislature from entering into specifics beyond the
situations to which arbitration could be applied 227 points to the sug-
gestive rather than preemptive character of the statute. The legisla-
ture has delegated rulemaking power to the Judicial Council, along
with full rights of implementation, as demonstrated by the extensive
rules promulgated by the Judicial Council pursuant to the statute.228
There is nothing to indicate that the grant of power to the Judicial
Council adds anything to the Council's already extensive rulemaking
power or is in lieu of the implementation powers available to it under
other statutes, in particular Code of Civil Procedure section 575.229
The Judicial Council's rulemaking power over pre-trial procedures
under section 575 appears to be plenary, because of the legislative
authorization to issue rules governing not only the time and manner
but also the "nature" of pre-trial procedures.230  If, as suggested, the
Judicial Arbitration Statute was not intended by the legislature to
preempt any powers already vested in the Judicial Council but merely
to suggest use of those powers toward a specific end, the Judicial
Council appears free to authorize compulsory arbitration as part of
mandatory settlement procedures prior to trial.
Among the considerable number of pre-trial practice rules issued
by the Judicial Council under section 575 is Rule of Court 207.5,
which provides for the creation of a settlement calendar in superior
226. See Turlock Golf & Country Club v. Superior Court. 240 Cal. App. 2d 693,
700, 50 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (1966), where the court determined that "the Legislature...
has prescribed the conditions under which a jury may be waived, and . .. the local
courts have no power to adopt or enforce rules at variance with those of the state. This
field has been preempted by the Legislature ...... See also Cantillon v. Superior
Court, 150 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-89, 309 P.2d 890, 893 (1957).
227. See note 164 & accompanying text supra.
228. See CAL. R. CT. 1601-17 (West Supp. 1977).
229. See notes 221, 223 & accompanying text supra.
230. Id.
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court by invitation of the parties. Although Rule of Court 207.5 does
not specifically authorize mandatory settlement conferences, the rule
states that "[t]he settlement procedure provided in this rule is not
intended to be exclusive, and local settlement procedures after the
completion of pre-trial proceedings are expressly authorized if con-
sistent with these rules.231 This rule should be read in conjunction
with Rule of Court 244.5 which empowers the presiding judge to "pre-
pare ... such ... local rules as are required to expedite and facilitate
the business of the court ...... 232 Considered together, these two
rules provide authority for superior courts to initiate local settlement
procedures for the purpose of alleviating backlog and delay.
The type of "local settlement procedures" referred to in Rule of
Court 207.5 are indicated by the Judicial Council in its Recommended
Standards of Judicial Administration. 233  Issued pursuant to constitu-
tional authority 234 these recommended standards include mandatory
settlement conferences.2 35  The standards not only require the active
participation of the litigants in the settlement conference but also
require an itemized list of special damages and, in a personal injury
case, a settlement offer.
236
Compulsory judicial arbitration fits within the definition of a
mandatory settlement conference. It is, not only mandatory but
also, in effect, a temporary settlement. This form of settlement is
accomplished through the determination of a parajudicial officer,
after a hearing under relaxed rules. Unlike a traditional settlement,
a judicial arbitration award is temporary; if either party requests trial
de novo, the award is vacated.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 575 authorizes the
Judicial Council to promulgate rules governing the "nature" of pre-
trial conferences. 237  The conclusion that a compulsory arbitration
procedure is a temporary settlement authorized by existing pre-trial
rules is supported by the Judicial Council's interpretation of the "na-
ture" of pre-trial conference procedures evidenced by Rules of Court
207.5 and 244.5, as well as by its recommendation of mandatory set-
tlement conferences.
238
231. CAL. R. CT. 207.5 (West Supp. 1977).
232. CAL. R. CT. 244.5 (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
233. See CAL. R. CT. app., div. I (West Supp. 1977) (Standards of Judicial Ad-
ministration).
234. See note 220 & accompanying text supra.
235. CAL. R. CT. app., div. I, § 9(d) (West Supp. 1977).
236. Id.
237. See note 223 & accompanying text supra.
238. See notes 232-35 & accompanying text supra. SANTA CLARA COUNTY SUPER.
CT. R. 23, which adopted compulsory arbitration by local rule, has not been challenged
to date. See note 125 & accompanying text supra.
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Consistency With Statutes and Judicial Council Rules
Even if the legislature has not preempted the field of judicial ar-
bitration and the Rules of Court authorize adoption of compulsory
arbitration, the question still arises whether a local rule adopting
compulsory arbitration would be in conflict with statutes or judicial
Council Rules. 23 9  Under California Government Code section 68070,
every local court may "make rules for its own government and govern-
ment of its officers," limited only by the requirement that such rules
not be "inconsistent with law or with the rules adopted and prescribed
by the Judicial Council."240  The courts have not developed a concise
rule of consistency. In general the courts compare the language of
the local rule to the language of the relevant statute or rule of the
Judicial Council. If plainly contrary the local rule will be found in-
valid under Government Code section 68070.241 In applying the
plainly contrary test, courts seek to determine whether the comparison
of language suggests that the statute or rule is the exclusive procedure
provided212 or whether the local rule is a permissible supplement
thereto.243  Even if the language is not plainly contrary, the local
239. CAL. GovTr CODE § 68070 (West 1976). See, e.g., Turlock Golf & Country
Club v. Superior Court, 240 Cal. App. 2d 693, 699,700, 50 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (1966)
(local rule requiring deposit of jury fees and mileage in excess of statutory amount
held invalid); Wisniewski v. Clary, 46 Cal. App. 3d 499, 504, 120 Cal. Rptr. 176,
180 (1975) (local rule requiring parties to be present at mandatory settlement con-
ference valid and not inconsistent with statute providing that a party may not be
forced to be personally present at trial); Cantillon v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App.
2d 184, 187-88, 309 P.2d 890, 892-93 (1957) (local rule providing sanctions when
attorney fails to attend or prepare for pre-trial conference valid in absence of specific
statutory sanction in pre-trial procedures); 1 B. Wrixi, CAL.FomqUA PROCEDURE,
Cours § 129 at 399-400 (2d ed. 1970).
240. Id.
241. (West 1976). See, e.g., Lantz v. Cole, 172 Cal. 245, 156 P. 45 (1916)
(shorter time for service of documents on adverse party inconsistent and invalid);
Connell v. Higgins, 170 Cal. 541, 150 P. 769 (1915); People v. Metropolitan Surety
Co., 164 Cal. 174, 128 P. 324 (1912); Albermont Petroleum, Ltd. v. Cunningham,
186 Cal. App. 2d 84, 9 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1960) (local rule requiring filing of affidavits
by noon of day preceding hearing inconsistent with statute permitting filing of summary
judgment counteraffidavits either prior to or at hearing); Conae v. Conae, 109 Cal.
App. 2d 696, 241 P.2d 266 (1952) (local rule requiring personal service of husband
in divorce action inconsistent with statute requiring service on attorney); Klokke Inv.
Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 717, 179 P. 728 (1919) (local rule requiring
registered mail inconsistent with statute allowing for ordinary mail and invalid). See
also I B. Wrrnw, CArm omA PbocanulrE, CouRTs § 119 at 389-90 (2d ed. 1970).
242. See, e.g., Sousa v. Capital Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 744, 34 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1963).
"The court has an inherent power of control over its proceedings and may enforce any
order it makes . . . . There is nothing in the [statute] that makes it the exclusive
method .... " Id. at 755, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
243. See, e.g., Greenamyer v. Board of Lugo Elem. School Dist., 116 Cal. App.
319, 323-24, 2 P.2d 848, 849-50 (1931).
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rule will be found invalid if it is inconsistent with a discoverable legis-
lative purpose.
244
On the one hand, even though the Judicial Arbitration Statute
is silent on compulsory procedures, compulsory arbitration by local
rule can be viewed as plainly contrary to the Judicial Arbitration
Statute because it would compel plaintiffs to arbitrate without elec-
tion. This argument is supported by the fact that the legislature
considered and rejected one form of compulsory arbitration sponsored
by the Judicial Council when enacting the final legislation. 245  On
the other hand, the statutory language provides no explicit indication
that plaintiff's election or both parties' stipulation is the exclusive24 6
method of judicial arbitration in California. By considering and re-
jecting one form of compulsory arbitration, the legislature may not
have intended to reject all forms in every California jurisdiction. Ab-
sent any definitive statement on this subject, a myriad of reasons are
possible. For example, the legislature could have rejected the pro-
cedure proposed by the Judicial Council 247 because it believed that
the limitation to personal injury cases involving special damages of
$1,000 or less was an improper or inflexible standard; or it may have
considered statewide application of this compulsory procedure to be
either unnecessary or unwarranted. The absence of a positive declar-
ation, the brevity of the enactment and the legislative silence as to
a compulsory procedure arguably permit the Judicial Council and
local courts to adopt this type of plan as a supplementary procedure.
Local rules adopting compulsory arbitration as part of mandatory
settlement procedures must also be consistent with Judicial Council
rules248 governing judicial arbitration and pre-trial procedures. Ju-
dicial Council rules governing judicial arbitration are silent on the
adoption of compulsory procedures. The Judicial Council rules ex-
pressly authorize the superior courts to enact local rules to expedite
the business of the courts249 and to develop local settlement proce-
dures. This silence, coupled with the express authorizations, 250 sug-
gests that a local rule adopting compulsory arbitration would not be
held contrary to Judicial Council rules.
244. Cf. Butterfield v. Butterfield, 1 Cal. 2d 277, 34 P.2d 145 (1934) (requirement
of points and authorities on motion for change of venue goes beyond the statutory
provision but is not inconsistent); Helbush v. Helbush, 209 Cal. 758, 290 P. 18 (1930)
(rule not inconsistent with statute and therefore valid).
245. See notes 156-61 & accompanying text supra.
246. See note 242 supra.
247. See note 156 & accompanying text supra.
248. See note 239 & accompanying text supra.
249. See note 232 & accompanying text supra.
250. See CAL. R. CT. 207.5 (West Supp. 1975). See also Wisniewski v. Clary,
46 Cal. App. 3d 499, 505 n.5, 120 Cal. Rptr. 176, 180 (1975).
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Even if not plainly contrary to statute or Judicial Council rule,
a local rule that goes beyond the specific authorization must further
the legislative or Judicial Council purpose in adopting the relevant
statute or rule. Otherwise, it will be treated as inconsistent and there-
fore void. In Butterfield v. Butterfield25 1 the California Supreme
Court indicated that a local rule that goes beyond a statutory provi-
sion is not inconsistent if it is a reasonable provision in furtherance
of the legislative purpose. The legislative purpose in adopting pre-
trial conference procedures was to expedite litigation and overcome
court congestion.2 52  Other pre-trial procedures have not succeeded
in achieving this legislative purpose as congestion and delay have ac-
tually increased since adoption of these procedures in 1955.253 Con-
sequently, compulsory arbitration with right to jury trial de novo is
a reasonable provision in furtherance of the legislative purpose in
adopting the pre-trial conference statute because it is a proven method
of reducing court congestion that preserves the right to a jury trial.254
In addition, although compulsory arbitration would not be en-
acted under the terms of the Judicial Arbitration Statute, it finds ad-
ditional support in the expressed legislative purpose behind the stat-
ute. Although the statute on its face is silent as to legislative pur-
pose, the Senate resolution that spawned the bill eventually enacted
indicates a concern for the delay and high cost of civil litigation. 255
Because compulsory arbitration will more quickly reduce delay and
high costs than an essentially voluntary procedure, 25  it is consistent
with the continuing legislative expression of concern over the con-
gestion and expense of the civil justice system. 7
Unreasonable Hardship
A local rule that is not plainly contrary to statute and that
251. 1 Cal. 2d 227, 228, 34 P.2d 145 (1934).
252. Cantillon v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 2d 184, 185, 309 P.2d 890, 891
(1957).
253. No statistics on backlog were published by the Administrative Office of the
California Courts for the years 1955-65. Even if pretrial procedures assisted in re-
ducing delay and backlog during that period, however, these procedures were not
sufficient to offset the substantial demand on the courts between 1965 and 1975.
Between those years there was a 44.5% increase in superior court complaint filings,
a 43.2% increase in dispositions with a corresponding 330% increase in backlog from
23,436 cases awaiting trial in 1965 to 77,421 in 1975. 1976 JDicrA. CouNcL REPORT,
supra note 20 at 100 (Table XVII), 104 (Table XVIII), 110 (Table XXII).
254. See note 263 & accompanying text infra.
255. See note 9 supra.
256. See notes 208-15 & accompanying text supra.
257. A recent statement of legislative concern regarding delay and the high cost
of civil litigation in small matters is found in CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1823 (West
Supp. 1977). See note 25 supra.
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furthered the legislative purpose would still be found invalid if it
caused unreasonable hardships.2 58  In adopting a compulsory pro-
cedure a local court imposes judicial arbitration on plaintiffs without
their election as an intermediary procedural step before the right to
a final adjudication at a trial de novo. There is a disadvantage to
a plaintiff who must go through two hearings and experience a sixty
to ninety day delay while the case is arbitrated before there is a
right to appeal to a trial de novo. Consequently, litigants in the five
percent of arbitrated cases subsequently tried to a verdict 259 are at
a disadvantage. The hardships, however, would not seem to be un-
reasonable.2 60  First, a local rule similar to Santa Clara's would im-
pose no cost or other deterrent for taking an appeal.261  Second, a
delay of another sixty to ninety days does not seem excessively bur-
densome in light of the current average delay of approximately twenty
months to trial from at-issue filing in the civil courts and the expected
increase in delay.262
Right to Trial by Jury
The final hurdle for compulsory judicial arbitration is constitu-
tional in nature. Is judicial arbitration with right to trial de novo
an effective denial of a civil jury trial as guaranteed by Article I, Sec-
tion 16 of the California Constitution? No California court has di-
rectly addressed this question. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
however, upheld that state's compulsory arbitration statute in the
Smith Case,263 finding that it was not violative of a constitutional
provision similar to California's. The court found that compelling
arbitration would be a denial of trial by jury and due process only
if the arbitrator's award was a final determination of the rights of
the parties: "[T]here is no denial of the right to trial by jury if the
statute preserves the right to each of the parties by the allowance of
an appeal from the decision of the arbitrators or other tribunal.."264
The court cited Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,265 which came to a
similar conclusion under the seventh amendment of the United States
Constitution. There, the United States Supreme Court held that
258. See Butterfield v. Butterfield, 1 Cal. 2d 227, 228, 34 P.2d 145 (1934).
259. See note 200 & accompanying text supra.
260. See Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub norm. Smith
v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955) (even the requirement of repaying arbitrators' fees,
if not excessive, was not a burdensome condition to the right to a trial de novo).
261. See notes 139-40 & accompanying text supra.
262. See notes 16-19 & accompanying text supra.
263. 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith v. Wissler, 350
U.S. 858 (1955).
264. 381 Pa. at 230, 112 A.2d at 629.
265. 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
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denying a civil jury trial in cases before a justice of the peace does
not violate the right to a common law jury trial if the parties have
the right to appeal to a court of record in which a jury trial is
available.
The Pennsylvania court went on to hold that a procedure that
allowed an eventual trial by jury in theory but denied it in practice
was as impermissible as a direct denial. Therefore, the right of ap-
peal to a trial de novo following arbitration "must not be burdened
by the imposition of onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations
which would make the right practically unavailable." 266  The court,
however, specifically found that a reimbursement of the arbitrator's
fee as a "deterrent on the taking of frivolous and wholly unjustified
appeals" was not a burdensome condition of appeal unless excessive.26
7
Analogous California decisions involving the due process right
to counsel in small claims court suggest that the California courts
would not find arbitration with right to trial de novo an effective de-
nial of a jury trial. In Brooks v. Small Claims Court268 the California
Supreme Court held that denying the right to counsel in small claims
court does not violate due process "as long as the right to appear by
counsel is guaranteed in a real sense somewhere in the proceeding...
[that is, if the defendant] has a right to appeal to the superior court
where he is entitled to a trial de novo . . . [and to] . . . appear by
counsel."29 The language of this decision, however, suggests that
266. 381 Pa. at 231, 112 A.2d at 629.
267. 381 Pa. at 233, 112 A.2d at 630. Under the particular facts of the Smith
Case, however, the $75 reimbursement of the arbitrator's fee was held to be excessive
when the damage claimed was $250.
268. 8 Cal. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1973).
269. Id. at 665-66, 504 P.2d at 1252, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 788, (quoting Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 382, 173 P.2d 38, 40 (1946)).
See also former CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 117j (West 1972) (repealed 1976) which
provided that: "[t]he judgment of said [small claims] court shall be conclusive upon
the plaintiff. If the defendant is dissatisfied, he may . .. appeal to the superior court
of the county in which said court is held. He shall pay, for filing the papers in the
superior court, the same fee as is charged and collected on the appeal of a civil action
from a justice court, and if final judgment is rendered against him in such superior
court, then he shall pay, in addition to said judgment, an attorneys fee to the plaintiff
in the sum of . . . $15. No fee shall be charged in the superior court upon the filing
of any document or paper by the plaintiff in a small claims action." Subsequent to
Brooks CAL. Crv. PRoc. CoDF § 117j was modified, 1975 Cal. Stats. c. 266 § 2, c. 990
§ 2, and then repealed, 1976 Cal. Stats. c. 1289 § 1. The current statute is CAL. CIV.
PRoc. CoDE §§ 117.8, 117.10 (West Supp. 1977) (added by 1976 Cal. Stats. c. 1289
§ 2) (the defendant shall pay the same filing fee as for the appeal of a civil action
from a justice court). See also, Comment, Application of Procedural Due Process
Standards to Small Claims Courts' Judgment Appeal Bond Requirements, 62 CALIF. L.
REv. 421 (1974).
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the California courts might be more likely than the Pennsylvania
courts to find appeal conditions unconstitutionally burdensome. The
court found unconstitutional the statutory requirement that the de-
fendant post a bond in the amount of the small claims court judgment
as a condition of appeal.2 70  Such an undertaking "constitutes a
taking of property prior to a due process hearing with right to coun-
sel .... This deprivation is indeed a taking, in spite of its temporary
nature.."271 This reasoning may have helped shape the California
Rules of Court and the Santa Clara local rules governing judicial ar-
bitration. Neither contain provisions for appeal bonds or reimburse-
ment of arbitrators' fees as a condition to the right of a trial de
novo.2 7 2  Because the procedure has dispensed with all such condi-
tions, both the Judicial Arbitration Statute and local rules compelling
arbitration in a form similar to that employed in Santa Clara would
most likely be upheld in California.
2 7 3
In sum, local courts have the authority to adopt compulsory ar-
bitration as part of mandatory settlement procedures pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 575 and Judicial Council Rules of Court
207.5 and 244.5. Furthermore, as required by Government Code sec-
tion 68070, the adoption of compulsory arbitration by local rule of
court is not inconsistent with the Judicial Arbitration Statute274 or
the Pre-Trial Conference Statute, or the Judicial Council rules pro-
mulgated pursuant to these statutes.275  Finally, compulsory judicial
arbitration is not an effective denial of a civil jury trial because the
only burden on the right to a trial de novo following a judicial arbitra-
tion award is the slight delay involved.
270. 8 Cal. 3d at 667, 504 P.2d at 1253, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 789. See note 269
supra.
271. 8 Cal. 3d at 667, 504 P.2d at 1253, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 789 (1973).
272. But cf. notes 139-40 & accompanying text supra with notes 177-79 & accom-
panying text supra.
273. This conclusion is further supported by a 1976 United States Supreme Court
decision, Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976), which upheld the Massachu-
setts two-tier court system in the face of an attack under the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Under that system, a person accused of certain crimes
is tried in the first instance in a lower tier where no trial by jury is available and is
thereafter entitled to a trial de novo by jury in a second tier. The Court held that
this procedure does not deprive the accused of his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial
nor unconstitutionally burden exercise of that right by imposing the financial cost of
an additional trial.
274. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.10 (West Supp. 1977) & text accompanying
note 245 supra.
275. See CAL. CIv. Pnoc. CODE § 575, CAL. R. CT. 1600-17 & text accompanying
notes 248-54 supra.
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Conclusion
The trial bar should aggressively utilize California's new arbitra-
tion procedures as promulgated under the Judicial Arbitration Statute.
Because these procedures are essentially voluntary, the initiative of
the bar will be critical to the success of judicial arbitration in Cali-
fornia. There is strong demonstrable and empirical evidence from
several jurisdictions indicating that judicial arbitration is able to de-
liver effective justice in that it is fair, expeditious, and economical.
It has also been shown to be a highly workable solution to the serious
problems of delay and backlog in the civil justice system. Moreover,
judicial arbitration is capable of producing these results without a
radical change in either substantive or procedural law. By throwing
its support to this new procedure, the bar will help to shape the dis-
position of uncomplicated, low value civil cases before a perhaps less
desirable alternative is imposed on the legal community by the public
through the legislature. In addition, the public image of the legal
community can only be improved if a large number of attorneys agree
to act as arbitrators.
Notwithstanding these strong reasons for the bar's support and
use of these voluntary arbitration procedures, past experience indi-
cates that the predictable caution of the bar toward a nontraditional
program will most probably result in limited utilization of judicial
arbitration. This cautiousness will seriously delay the full beneficial
effects of judicial arbitration at a time when California superior courts
are threatened with increased backlog and delay. For these reasons
and because ample evidence exists that judicial arbitration achieves
effective justice, the legislature should replace voluntary with com-
pulsory judicial arbitration. In the absence of legislation local courts
should adopt compulsory arbitration by local rule patterned to their
specific needs, perhaps modeled after the Santa Clara Compulsory Ar-
bitration Procedure. Most California superior courts should seriously
consider adopting compulsory arbitration rules because all but three
have an elapsed time from at-issue memorandum to trial greater
than the six months guideline established by the California Judicial
Council. 27
6
The use of the compulsory form of judicial arbitration will ensure
not only that effective justice is delivered to litigants who participate
in arbitration but also that those disputants remaining within the
traditional civil justice system will benefit from reduced congestion
in the courts.
276. See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
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Continued debate over comprehensive procedures to improve ju-
dicial administration in California appears inevitable. In the mean-
time, the public can demand no less than the bar's enthusiastic sup-
port of the proven remedy: judicial arbitration with the right to
trial de novo.
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